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WALKING BY FAITH James Freeman |
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"We walk by faith, and not by sight" (2 Cor. 5:7) In this chapter
the Apostle is treating of the immortality of man. With great
confidence, he expresses his hope of a future state of happiness.
Nevertheless, he adds, we walk by faith, and not by sight. That
is, this immortality is not a matter of knowledge, but of belief.
We cannot demonstrate it, though we are firmly persuaded of its
truth. The assertion of the Apostle is not applicable to a future
state only; but in almost all the doctrines of revealed
religion, we walk by faith and not by sight. Absolute knowledge,
in few cases, is granted to us; what we believe may be
probable, but it is not certain; for here we see through a glass
darkly, and know in part. In a future world we hope to enjoy
perfect knowledge; but the present world is in some measure a
scene of obscurity. As a
consideration of this subject is adapted to make us cautious,
humble, and candid, it deserves attention. At the same time, it is
of importance to show that the prejudices, which are entertained
against religion on this account, are ill-founded; for if we walk
by faith in religion, we are guided by the same light in almost
everything else. We ought not therefore to object against
revelation because it cannot be demonstrated, for demonstration is
not afforded us in other subjects. Man, however,
anxiously wishes for certainty in everything of importance, and
when he does not possess it, is disposed to complain. “Why has
not God made what we are to believe so plain and evident, as that
all doubts should be prevented?” is a common inquiry. “Why has
he not revealed himself so clearly, as that we should be as
certain of his existence as of our own?” “Why do we not only
believe, but know, that he is one being, who is infinitely
powerful, wise, and good, the creator of heaven and earth, and the
judge of men?” “Why are we not enabled absolutely to determine
whether Jesus Christ is a pre-existent being, or only a man?”
“Why do we not certainly know whether or not he is an object of
prayer?” “Why have we not more than probable evidence of the
truth of Christianity?” “Why are men permitted to dispute
about the meaning of its doctrines?” “Why is there such
obscurity in the language of the sacred writers, as that
controversies should exist concerning the trinity, the atonement
of Christ, original sin, predestination, and everlasting
punishment?” “Why do we not understand St. Paul as well as he
understood himself, and why should it be possible that so many
different explanations can be made of his words?” “In
particular, why do we not know that we are immortal? Why have we
not such evidence as that it would be impossible to doubt of a
future state? Why does not a ghost return from the other world, or
a dead man rise, and make this important doctrine certain?”
“We are frequently told that we shall be punished hereafter for
the deeds done in the body; we wish that we absolutely knew this,
for certain knowledge would have a greater influence on our
conduct, than mere faith, however lively it may be. We have also
heard that we shall meet our virtuous friends in a better state.
If we were certain of this, we should see them die with more
resignation.” Such
language as this is natural to man. There are few of us who have
not felt it and spoken it in our hearts. In particular, when we
have been inquiring after truth, when we have been disputing
concerning any doctrine of revealed religion, when we have been
defending Christianity against the objections of infidels and have
found how easy it is to involve the subject in obscurity, we have
ardently wished that a voice from heaven, or some other proof,
which might infallibly be depended on, would decide the
controversy at once and remove every doubt. May we not say
that the goodness of God would vouchsafe us the demonstration
which we desire, if it was proper or possible? But he does not in
fact; we live the life of faith, and not of knowledge: such is the
constitution of things. Satisfied that whatever God does is right,
I conceive that it is our duty not to complain of this system and
to wish that it might be altered, but to endeavour to find out its
reasons. Let us therefore inquire why it is that God causes us to
walk by faith and not by sight, after which let us attempt to show
that from this constitution of things advantages result, which we
could not enjoy, if, in every case, we possessed absolute
knowledge. I. The most important doctrine of religion is that there is one God of infinite perfection, by whose power we were created, by whose providence we are preserved, whom therefore we are bound to love, to worship, and obey, and to whom we are accountable for all our conduct. This truth is proved by the strongest probable arguments, the evidence of which is nearly irresistible. It does not amount, however, to strict demonstration. There have been persons who have doubted of the being of God, which shows that this truth is not as certain as mathematical propositions, for no man can, or does, doubt of them. Here then some may be ready to desire that the Supreme Being had revealed himself more fully; so that we might not only rationally believe, but absolutely know, that he exists. But, it may be
asked, how could this have been done? As God is infinite, it is
impossible that he should become the object of any one of our
senses. We could not be made to see or feel him, who has
neither parts, nor limits, nor form, nor colour, nor motion. We
see his works, and he has given us understanding, by which, when
it is properly directed, we are capable of discerning their
contrivance, beauty, and harmony, and of perceiving that they must
have an author of great power and wisdom. The visible world
manifests to the well-tutored eye, that there is a God, but so
sublime an idea as that of a Deity would not of itself enter the
uninstructed mind. On the contrary, it is probable that men are
indebted for their first knowledge of this truth to a divine
communication, or to a tradition, derived from this source.
Revelation informs us that the world was produced by an
intelligent cause. But revelation is not an object of knowledge,
but of faith. Even then with respect to the being of a God, the
most important of all truths, we walk by faith, and not by sight;
and it seems not possible that it could otherwise be. We believe that
God has made a revelation of himself in the sacred Scriptures, and
that to them we are indebted for our notions of religious and
moral truths. Now it is evident to any person, who attentively
considers the nature of it, that it was not easy, nor practicable,
to make it an object of knowledge. Revelation is contained in a
certain number of books, all of them written near two thousand
years since. The authority of them, who delivered its doctrines,
was confirmed by miracles, or evidences of supernatural power. Our
acquaintance with these facts is derived from the testimony of the
Apostles and others, whom we have reason to believe were
intelligent, impartial, and sincere witnesses. They knew that what
they declared was true, but it is impossible that we should know
it in the same manner, or have anything more than a probable proof
of it, unless God had continued a series of miracles from that age
to the present, which would produce more bad than good effects.
These books were written by men in the languages with which they
were familiar, which, like all other human languages, are
imperfect and contain words which are used in different senses and
abound with figurative modes of expression, the precise meaning of
which cannot always be ascertained. These languages are unknown to
us, and before we can read the Scriptures in our own tongues, we
are obliged to procure translations of them, made by fallible and
uninspired men. From these causes and others of the same kind,
there are obscurities in these books; and the consequence is that
Christians of different sects do not understand all their
doctrines in the same sense. We may add that every part of the
Scriptures is not equally clear. The preceptive parts are plain,
but the opinions of the Apostles and their reasonings are
sometimes dark and hard to be understood. Perhaps also the first
disciples, who immediately succeeded the Apostles, were not
perfectly uniform in their ideas on points of less importance.
They agree in their general doctrines, but it was not necessary
that they should agree in every minute article of their creeds;
and as they were men like ourselves, nothing short of a perpetual
miracle could have produced this perfect unity of sentiment. Why
then should we complain that, with respect to revelation, we are
obliged to walk by faith and not by sight? Is not this complaining
that men are made as they are? Is it not finding fault with the
natural imperfection of the human understanding and requiring that
God should change the constitution of things? An
extensive inquiry into the nature of Christianity and a laboured
delineation of its evidences would show that probability must be
the foundation on which it rests. This task, however, would
demand, not a single discourse, but volumes. The hints which I
have given manifest that it is vain to expect mathematical
demonstration in so complicated an argument. It may still be urged that we have a right to require positive proof of the immortality of man. Here we ought to be indulged with the clearest sight, because the doctrine, if true, is of the highest importance, as it is intimately connected with our virtue and happiness. But let us not be
hasty in requiring this proof. If man is immortal, it must be in
consequence of the free gift of God. He has no right to demand
immortality, and there are few arguments from nature which lead
him to expect it. On the supposition that there is in man a
spiritual substance distinct from his body, how could its
existence be proved? For as it is not material, it cannot be made
either visible or palpable. To require therefore that spirits
should appear, to demonstrate to us the immortality of the soul,
is demanding an impossibility. But if our immortality depends on
the resurrection of the dead, our idea of it must be the same as
that of revelation itself: it must be faith, and not sight. If we
believe the New Testament to be the word of God, as we may
rationally do, we can entertain no reasonable doubt of it; but as
we cannot obtain absolute demonstration of the one, so neither can
we strictly demonstrate the other. II. These
observations may show that the constitution of things, by which we
are made to walk by faith and not by sight, cannot easily be
changed. There are advantages resulting from this system, which we
could not enjoy, if, in every case, we possessed absolute
knowledge. One—and
it is of great importance—is that, by the present constitution
of things, the understanding is sharpened and improved, employment
is found for the mind, and man is rendered active. If all truths
were certain, man would lead a life of indolence. There would be
an end of inquiry, of debate, of criticism; almost all the books
in the world would be annihilated, and the learned professions
would be extinct. In a word, we should have nothing to do but to
open our eyes and receive the light which was poured in upon them.
Some persons may conceive that such a state would be better than
the present. But they, who have this imagination, have never
tasted the pleasure which is derived from a minute examination of
an intricate subject, in which knowledge is obtained and truth
discovered by degrees. There is a satisfaction, a
self-complacence, in exercising the reasoning powers, which
permits us not to regret the want of absolute knowledge.
When the judgment is employed in investigating our own
ideas, in separating truth from falsehood, which are so intimately
blended in almost all subjects, in exploding error, in deducing
new truths from truths already believed, or even in probable
conjecture, a delight is experienced, which would be altogether
unknown if every proposition was
immediately clear and certain. How pleasing is
it, for example, to follow the arguments of such a noble and
wonderful book as Butler's Analogy, and to trace the complicated
evidences of Christianity in the profound works of the preachers
at the Boylean Lectures! If the truths of the gospel were
self-evident, the world would never have seen those learned
apologies, which, in all ages, have done honour to the church, and
which have so highly exalted the minds, not only of their authors,
but of their readers. Another advantage
resulting from this constitution of things is that it furnishes us
with an opportunity of exercising humility, candour, and
forbearance. As we walk by
faith and not by sight, we ought to be humble and modest in our
opinions. We ought not to assert any thing too positively, as we
may, notwithstanding all our inquiries, be in an error. We ought
to keep our minds open to conviction and to the reception of new
ideas, however contrary they may be to the notions which we have
formerly entertained. We should be sensible of the imperfection of
our knowledge and think, and reason, and act, with that caution,
which becomes beings who are absolutely certain of very few
truths. In consequence of this system, by which we are made to walk by faith and not by sight, there is a variety of opinions among Christians. Almost all subjects can be viewed in different lights and are attended with obscurities. This variety need not produce any ill effects, for as Christians agree in the essential point, the necessity of loving God and our neighbour, the interest of virtue is secure upon every system; but it affords an opportunity of displaying candour and forbearance. There is nothing more amiable than liberality and indulgence toward them, who differ from us in opinion. If we all believed exactly the same things, our benevolence would not be so meritorious; for we naturally love them, who resemble us, but to love them, whom we think erroneous, is generous, is charitable. On the whole,
from a view of the subject, it appears that in religion it is
proper that we should walk by faith and not by sight. But this
system, whether it is right or wrong, is analogous to all the
other dispensations of divine Providence. In nature, in
government, in civil and domestic life, in agriculture, and in
every kind of business, it is no less true than in religion that
we walk by faith and not by sight. The statesman, who with the
experience and accumulated wisdom of preceding ages forms a
constitution of government, cannot promise himself more than a
probability of success; he cannot certainly foresee what will be
the effect of his plans. The parent, who with the utmost care
educates his child, knows not that the instruction which he
communicates will produce any good effect; he can only rationally
hope that his offspring will become intelligent and virtuous. The
husbandman, who tills his fertile soil under an auspicious sun, is
not certain, however probable it may be, that he shall gather in
the harvest. The merchant, who sends his ships to a foreign port,
knows not, though chances may be greatly in his favour, that they
will ever return. If the statesman, the parent, the husbandman,
and the merchant ought not complain because they walk by faith,
and not by sight, ought the Christian to complain, because he walks in the same manner? Though faith
however is the light by which we must guide our steps in the
doctrines of religion, yet the duties of it are clear and certain.
Whether our own opinions of Christianity are true or false, it is
our duty to be pious and virtuous, to practise the precepts which
are contained in the gospel. These precepts are agreeable to
nature and reason, and must be true, whatever our speculative
system may be. Christianity, which teaches them, is supported by
innumerable probable arguments. Let them who deny this assertion
examine the subject with care. In every step which they take, they
will find proofs accumulating upon them, which they cannot easily
resist; and they should acknowledge that it is not less absurd to
neglect their moral conduct, because they cannot demonstrate by
irrefragable arguments a future state of rewards and punishments,
than it is to neglect exertion in any other case, because they
cannot positively answer for the success of their plans. Uncertain
as events may be, sufficient motives present themselves to induce
us to be virtuous; and if we refuse to attend to them, it cannot
be allowed that we act with wisdom. 1st Sunday in Advent.
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