The Right and Duty of Private Judgment Asserted

Jonathan Mayhew

“And he said also to the people, When ye see a cloud rise out of the west, straightway ye say, There cometh a shower; and so it is. And when ye see the south-wind blow, ye say, There will be heat; and it cometh to pass. Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky, and of the earth: but how is it, that ye do not discern this time? Yea, and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?” –Luke 12:54-57.

Having attempted to show, in two former discourses upon these words, that there is a natural difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and that men are naturally endowed with faculties proper for the discerning of these differences, I proceed now to show in the  

III’d, and last place, that men are under obligation to exert these faculties and to judge for themselves in things of a religious concern. It cannot be doubted but that this is fairly implied in my text. For the words evidently carry in them a severe censure and reproof of the persons to whom they were originally addressed, on account of their neglecting to judge for themselves concerning our blessed Saviour and his doctrine. He makes this neglect an argument of their hypocrisy, one of the basest vices—“Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky—and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?” 

The subject before us being the duty of private judgment, I shall briefly explain what I intend by persons judging for themselves, or by freedom of thought and inquiry in religious matters, and then show that this is what we are all obliged to.

Now what I intend by a man's judging for himself with freedom, and exerting his own faculties in the search of truth and right, may be comprised under the following particulars—

That he suspends his judgment entirely concerning the truth or falsehood of all doctrines, and the fitness or unfitness of all actions, 'till such time as he sees some reason to determine his judgment one way rather than the other. He that desires to come to the knowledge of the truth puts himself in a slate of indifferency with regard to the point to be judged of, that so his mind being, as it were, in equilibrio, his judgment may be determined solely by reason and argument. He does not bring his old prejudices and prepossessions to determine the point, but comes prepared, by an unbiased mind, to receive the impressions of reason, and of reason only. All propositions are the proper subject of inquiry and examination, except first principles, which are few in number and which do not extend to any doctrines either of natural or revealed religion, how nearly soever they may be connected with some of both. And, therefore, in order to our judging with true freedom, we ought to consider all such doctrines with an eye of indifferency, neither fancying them to be true or false, nor even wishing them to be so, till we see they are connected with, or contrary to, some of those first principles of human knowledge, which, being self-evident, are not the subject of examination. Thus, for example, we ought not to believe that there is, or that there is not a God, that the Christian religion is from God, or an imposture, that any particular doctrine fathered upon it is really contained in it or not, or that any particular sect of Christians is in the right or in the wrong, till we have impartially examined the matter and see evidence on one side or the other. For to determine any point without reason or proof cannot be to judge freely, unless it be in a bad sense of the word, so that suspense or indifferency is the first thing implied in free inquiry; or, to speak more properly, it is a prerequisite, and preparatory to it.

Again: The next step towards freedom of examination and judgment is the exerting of our own reason in weighing arguments and evidences that offer themselves to us, or that are offered by others. He that inquires freely after truth is not content with barely suspending his judgment till such time as evidence forces itself upon his mind. In this way, a man may perhaps avoid error, but will not gain much knowledge, for truth is coy and must be courted. To gain any considerable degree of knowledge, it is necessary that we are active and vigorous in the pursuit of it, that we make use of all the means and helps to knowledge that are within our reach, that we inquire into facts, that we view things in different lights, not taking up satisfied with first appearances, that we weigh the arguments that are brought to support any doctrine or practice, that we balance them, with contrary arguments, and the like.

Another thing implied in the freedom of judgment is that a man honestly embraces for truth whatever there appears evidence for, without endeavouring to evade it, to shift it off, or stifle the conviction of his own mind. To inquire into evidence is to no purpose unless we follow it wherever it leads and cheerfully receive the truth wherever it is to be found, whatever notions it may contradict, whatever censures it may expose us to. It is an idle and inconsistent thing to examine if we are determined beforehand to retain our former sentiments, to believe as our forefathers did, or as any particular body of men does at present. A man does not really inquire after truth and right at all unless he determines from the very first to have no superstitious veneration for great names, but to yield himself up to evidence wherever it appears and how much soever it might have contributed to his present interest and reputation to have embraced other tenets.

Lastly: Judging with freedom and impartiality implies that in giving our assent to any proposition, we give it in proportion to the degree of evidence that appears to support it. All truths are not equally clear and incontestable. Innumerable lie quite beyond our sight; some just dawn upon our minds, others appear in a strong and convincing light, though not so strong as to exclude all doubt, while others glare upon us with all the force of demonstration. Now as there are innumerable degrees of evidence between the lowest probability and that intuitive certainty which we have of first principles, so a man ought not to give the same degree of assent to everything he receives for truth, but to proportion his assent to the nature and degree of the apparent evidence, whether it be greater or less. Not to assent to what is, in the lowest degree, probable, upon the whole, discovers a backwardness to entertain the truth. And, on the other hand, to give an assent to any truth over and beyond what the nature of its evidence naturally demands and calls forth is much the same thing with believing without any evidence at all. For all that redundancy of assent, if I may so express it, is mere credulity and rashness, and this is as unbecoming a reasonable creature as obstinacy and perverseness.

Having thus briefly explained what I intend by judging for ourselves, with freedom, I proceed now to show that this is what every man is under obligation to do. This I propose to prove directly by reason and revelation, and then to answer the principal objections that are urged against it.

Each individual has an interest of his own depending. We find, by experience, that we are all capable of being happy or miserable to a great degree. Pain and pleasure, at least, are private and personal things. And even they that arrogate to themselves the fight of judging for us do not pretend to feel for us also. Now if it be of any importance to us to be happy for ourselves, it is of importance to judge for ourselves also, for this is absolutely necessary in order to our finding the path that leads to happiness. Indeed, if others can afford us any assistance in finding this path, it is reasonable to make use of it, but not to give ourselves up entirely to their direction. It is the greatest folly imaginable to give ourselves no concern about our own welfare, unless we were certain it is secured to us already, so that we cannot possibly miss of it, which is a supposition contrary to daily experience. We find that our happiness depends, at least in some degree, upon our conduct, and that we often take some wrong step through ignorance, which ought to be a warning to us to look about us and take heed to our ways.—Without knowing which is the right path, we can never take it, unless it be by chance, and though we should be so fortunate as to get into it, we cannot have the satisfaction of knowing it.

In our present imperfect state, such inquiries as the following become every man that has not yet resolved them in his own mind: “What is my chief good? Where is the road that will convey me to my happiness? Where shall I find this inestimable jewel, this “pearl of great price” [Matt. 13:45-46]? In what mountain shall I dig for it? In what ocean shall I dive? Amidst the various opinions and contrary pursuits of mankind, what road shall I myself travel? What course shall I steer? Shall I find my felicity in retirement and solitude or in the noise and bustle of the world? Is it to be found in the humble and quiet cottage or in proud and envious courts? Is it to be found in peace at home or in war abroad? Does it consist in indulging to my animal nature without control or in improving my mind in what some men call wisdom and virtue? Shall I seek it in my own country or explore some distant region in hopes to find it? Shall I search it upon the seas or upon the dry land? In the earth beneath or in the heavens above? In this world or in some other? Is my spirit immortal? Am I to survive the dissolution of my body and to live forever in some other state, or shall this vital spark that thinks, perceives, and wills, and is anxious about futurity, be wholly extinguished in a few days when my body falls to dust? Is there any being who created and who governs the world, or is this beautiful and stupendous fabric of the universe the offspring of chance and without any overseer or ruler—a fatherless world, which the next moment may fall into ruins, or into nothing? If there be a God, what is his character? Is he powerful, wise, righteous, and good, or is he not? Does my happiness depend upon pleasing and obeying him and conforming myself to his will? If it does, what is his will? What are his laws? What does he expect of me? What kind of government is it I am under? What is the particular and certain way in which I may obtain the goodwill of this great Parent of the world, “in whose favour is life” [Psalm 16:11], and “whose loving-kindness is better than life” [Psalm 63:3]?

These, methinks, are such inquiries as every man should endeavour to get some satisfaction about in his own mind—satisfaction of quite another kind than any that can be had barely from the decisions of others concerning them. The questions are too interesting and important to be submitted to the determination of a second person.

But were we disposed to leave matters of this consequence to reference, who shall be the judges? There are almost as many opinions in the world as there are men. The Talapoins of Siam have one system of religion, the Mufti at Constantinople another, and Christians a third, and so on. And almost all allege divine revelation in their own favour. There are even some ‘fools who say in their heart, there is no God’ [Psalm 14:1], and not only in their heart, but repeat it with their lips also. Now shall we submit to the theists, or to the atheists? How shall we know on which side the truth lies, without examination? But suppose we embrace theism—what sect of the theists shall we fall in with: with those who deny, or those who maintain, a revelation from God? Is it reasonable to give in to either party before we inquire which has the best of the argument? But suppose we fall in with the latter—there are several sects of them, the principal of which are Jews, Mahometans, and Christians. It cannot be a reasonable part to fall in with one, in opposition to the other two, without reason. But suppose we are convinced that the Christian religion is true, do not Christians differ very widely in their sentiments? Do they not differ so much in explaining the doctrines of their common revelation as to agree in hardly anything besides the name of “Christian”? Are they not divided into many sects, the most of which strenuously maintain that not only truth, but salvation also, is confined to themselves? Do they not deal out their curses mutually with a liberal hand? Are they not continually “throwing fire-brands, arrows, and death” [Prov. 26:18-19] (not, indeed, in sport, like other fools, but) in sober earnest?

Now amidst these differences and altercations, what is the part of a reasonable man, but to sit down and exercise, as well as he can, his own intellectual powers, and so to ‘judge even of himself what is right’? What system of doctrine—what mode of worship—what form of church-government and discipline is most agreeable to scripture and reason—what sect of Christians he shall unite with—and whether with any one, in all its minute and distinguishing tenets and usages—? “A man must join himself to the true, primitive, and catholic church.” What church is that? All churches lay claim to that title; and the question to be decided is: “Which of them supports its claim the best?” which cannot be decided without previous inquiry. “But there is a living infallible guide upon earth, to whom it is easy to repair, and then we may be sure of being in the right without any farther trouble.” Where is he? Many deny there is any such unerring guide and infallible umpire, as consistently as others affirm it. But even those who agree that there is such a sovereign judge of religious controversy are not yet fully agreed who he is, or whether infallibility be to be found in one single person or more. The heads of all sects usually decide disputable matters with full as much assurance and lordliness as it would become infallibility itself to do it, although they do not all, in so many words, pretend to be exempted from a possibility of erring. Those who claim infallibility often decide and order as if they were fallible, and those who do not claim it are often full as positive and given to domineering as much as if it unquestionably belonged to them.

We know the king of Great Britain (or the queen in a female reign) is the Supreme Head of the church of England, as by law established, which church claims power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith.

But his Holiness at Rome thinks this a bold infringement of his prerogative and universal jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters. Whose word, then, is to be taken? How shall we act a rational part without ‘judging even of ourselves which is in the right,’ or whether either of them be so. Indeed there is no doubt but his Holiness is really the Supreme Head of the Church of Rome, and, as such, has authority therein in matters of faith, worship, and discipline. Thus also the King or Queen of Great Britain is doubtless the Supreme Head of the truly primitive, apostolical church of England, as lately established by human laws. But nevertheless, it may perhaps admit of some dispute whether Jesus Christ is not the Supreme Head of his own church, and consequently whether these are not three different churches, they having each of them a different Supreme Head? It is of some importance to us to be settled with regard to these points; and they are such as cannot be well determined without some examination, though perhaps a very little may suffice.

Thus it appears that a regard to our own interest ought to put us upon examining and judging for ourselves in religious concerns. The same thing might be argued from the faculty of reason itself, which is common to all. If we suppose an intelligent author of our nature, who had some design in giving us our present constitution, it is plain that his end in endowing us with faculties proper for the investigating of truth and right was that we should exercise them in this way. Each of our bodily organs and animal faculties has an apparent final cause. Our eyes are for seeing, our ears for hearing, our hands for handling, our feet for walking, etc. Nor is it less apparent that our understandings were given us to be employed in the search of truth and in embracing it. Truth is the natural object of reason, as much as anything else is the proper object of that particular faculty or passion, to which God and nature have adapted it. Our obligation, therefore, to inquire after truth and to judge what is right may be found within us, in our own frame and constitution. This obligation is as universal as reason itself, for everyone that is endowed with this faculty is, by the very nature of it, obliged to exercise it in the pursuit of knowledge, especially of moral and religious knowledge. All men are not obliged to study mathematics, law and physics, but all are obliged to acquaint themselves with their duty—what they owe to God, to their neighbour and themselves. If one man is to think and judge for all the rest of the species, why was reason given to all? Why was it not confined to him alone who has a right to use it? In short, we may say with as much propriety that we are to see only with another's eyes, hear with another's ears, speak with another's tongue, and walk with another's feet, and neglect our own, as that we are to think, and judge, and believe with another's understanding. It appears, then, that reason is no enemy to free inquiry and private judgment in religious matters. And I shall now endeavour to show that the Christian religion is no enemy to it, but, on the contrary, enjoins it upon us as a duty.  

Our Lord Jesus Christ, “the author and finisher of our faith” [Heb. 12:2], constantly appealed to the senses and to the reason of mankind as the proper judges of his miracles, divine mission and doctrine. He did not demand of men an implicit and blind belief in himself without offering matter of conviction to their understandings, but put them upon examining in a sober rational way whether he was authorized from heaven or were an impostor, and so whether his doctrine were ‘of God, or whether he spake of himself’ [John 7:17]. He reasons with the Jews in my text; he blames them for their blind attachment to the Scribes and Pharisees, their spiritual guides, and for not judging for themselves in religious matters. Our Lord pretended (at least) to prove his divine mission to the unprejudiced reason of mankind in a sober, argumentative way. In disputing with the Jews, he appealed to their ancient writings, whose divine authority they acknowledged, and to the miracles which he wrought, in order to convince them that he was the Messiah. This is evident from almost every page of the evangelical history, notwithstanding what the disingenuous author of Christianity Not Founded Upon Argument has consistently asserted upon this subject, taking advantage of what some weak Christians have advanced concerning the nature and grounds of faith. Whether the arguments which our Lord used for the conviction of the Jews were conclusive or not is a question which I am not now concerned with. But it is plain that he considered them as being so, requiring people to examine them, and to judge whether they were conclusive or not. Barely proposing arguments to the consideration of another is a disclaiming of authority properly so called, for it implies that the arguments are to be judged of by the reason of him to whom they are proposed. I might bring many passages from the Evangelists to show that the method which our Lord took to gain proselytes was to reason them into faith. But I must content myself with quoting one passage only to this purpose, for the present—John 5: 31 and onward: “If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true [i.e., my testimony in my own favour—my declaring myself to be the Messiah—ought not to be depended upon as true without farther evidence.] There is another that beareth witness of me—Ye sent unto John, and he bare witness unto the truth—But I have greater witness than that of John; for the works that the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me—Search the scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me—There is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust. For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?” There cannot be a more explicit appeal than this, to the reason and understandings of men, or a fairer invitation given them to examine and judge for themselves. And this also shows that our Lord aimed at bringing men to believe in him only by dint of argument. And as our Lord performed his mighty works with a design to beget in those that beheld them a rational belief, a belief resulting from proper evidence, so the Evangelists committed those facts to writing, that they might have a like effect upon those that had not been eyewitnesses of them—“These things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God, and that believing, ye might have life through his name” (John 20:31). 

The apostles also constantly encouraged free inquiry, as it is natural for honest undesigning men to do. It is for the interest of some to discourage it, and to keep people muffled up in darkness and ignorance, that so they may submit to their dictates with the more readiness and humility. Their craft is in danger of being detected, and their doctrine of being exploded, as soon as people have so much presumption as to open their eyes.   Free inquiry bodes ill to the design which they are engaged in, for they are sensible it will not be safe for themselves to be knaves any longer than others are fools. But he that has nothing in view but the interest of truth and virtue desires nothing more than that persons would give themselves the trouble of a free and impartial examination. Now the apostles, knowing the goodness of their cause, and following the example of their divine Master, made it their practice to encourage liberty and freedom of thought, never intimating, as most of their pretended successors have done, that this is hazardous to men's souls. 

In the apostolic age there were many impostors and enthusiasts, false pretenders to inspiration, as there are at present, and as there have been in almost every age of the Christian church. And for this reason the apostles directed Christians to examine the pretensions of all, that so they might distinguish between really inspired persons and deceivers—Thus 1 John 4:1: “Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirit, whether they are of God; for many false spirits are gone out into the world.” No one, surely, will be so absurd as to suppose this was a direction to try deceivers only, and not true prophets and apostles. For this would suppose that they might be known one from the other, without trying them at all, and then no examination of either of them would be necessary. “Determine first, and then examine,” is the pleasant advice of some grave divines, but the apostles exhort us to examine all things before we believe anything. The Jews at Berea are celebrated (Acts 17:10 and onwards) for not believing the apostles themselves without critically examining their doctrine and comparing it with the writings of Moses and the prophets; and in the same passage an implicit censure, at least, is passed upon the Thessalonians as being indolent, credulous, and too easy of belief. The words of the historian are these: “And the brethren sent away Paul and Silas unto Berea; who coming there went into the synagogue of the Jews. These were more noble than those of Thessalonica; for they received the word with all readiness of mind: and searched the scriptures daily whether those things were so.” By their receiving the word with all readiness of mind, nothing more is here intended than that they gave a ready and candid attention to what Paul and Silas had to say. Afterwards, like prudent and rational men, they examined into the truth of it. And it follows immediately in the next verse—“Therefore many of them believed”—a natural consequence of a free and impartial inquiry into the grounds of the Christian religion. I observed above that the Thessalonians are censured in this passage for their credulity and not using suitable precaution in receiving Christianity. And it is probable that the apostle Paul had a view at this incurious and overcredulous humour of theirs in his first Epistle to them (Chap. 5, ver. 21): “Prove (or examine) all things,” says he, “Hold fast that which is good.” This advice was, in-deed, proper for all, but peculiarly so for those who were backward to examine, and forward to believe, these being in the greatest danger of being induced. 

Again, what besides free inquiry after truth and knowledge does the apostle intend? (Phil. 1:9-10): “And this I pray, that your love may abound yet more and more in knowledge and in all judgment, that ye may approve things that are excellent” (or as some understand these last words, “that ye may try things that differ, and are controverted”).    To the same purpose are the words of this apostle (Eph. 6:14-15): “that we be henceforth no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness whereby they lie in wait to deceive: but speaking the truth in love,” etc. So St. John cautions the “elect lady and her children” against seducers and deceivers: “Many deceivers are entered into the world…. Look to yourselves” (2 John 7-8). The apostle here alludes to those deceivers ‘who confessed not that Jesus Christ was come in the flesh.’ And in his first Epistle he cautions those to whom he wrote against another kind of deceivers, whose doctrine is equally fatal, viz. those who taught that faith without works denominates a man righteous: “Little children, let no man deceive you: He that doth righteousness is righteous…. He that committeth sin is of the devil” (1 John 3:7-8).  Thus also the apostle Paul (Eph. 5:5-6): “Ye know that no whore-monger, etc, hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ, and of God. Let no man deceive you with vain words: for because of these things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience.” Do not all these exhortations given to Christians to take care that “no man deceive” them imply that they are to examine and judge for themselves, and not to submit implicitly to the dictates of any, even though they pretend to a commission from heaven? Unless it be their right and duty to do thus, nothing can be more impertinent than exhortations of this kind. 

Although the apostle Paul were an inspired writer, yet he is far from putting on those dogmatical airs which are now too common amongst those who do not pretend to inspiration. He often condescends to make an appeal to the reason and judgment of those to whom he writes and invites them to examine what he says. Thus 1 Cor. 10:15: “I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.” And so Chap. 1, ver. 12: “ Judge in yourselves, is it comely,” etc. 

In a controversy between the Jewish and Gentile converts at Rome, the apostle gave his own sense concerning the point in debate: he exhorted them to mutual love and forbearance; and then, like a reasonable, catholic man, and a friend to the rights of private judgment, he concludes: “Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind” (Rom. 14:5). 

When Jewish converts in Galatia (being still zealously attached to the law of Moses) were for imposing certain opinions and practices upon the Gentiles, the same apostle took the part of the latter, and even enjoined it upon them to vindicate their religious and Christian rights against all such encroachments: “Stand fast,” says he, “in the liberty, wherewith Christ has made you free (i. e. assert your freedom from the Mosaic law, and all the old Jewish institutions) and be not again entangled with any yoke of bondage” (i. e. stand up in defence of your Christian liberty, not only against these your Judaizing brethren, but also against all others who shall attempt to exercise any kind of spiritual tyranny over you) (Gal. 5:1). So that it is not left to the option of Christians whether they will relinquish their natural liberty in religious matters or not; they are commanded to assert it. God has given us abilities to ‘judge even of ourselves what is right,’ and requires us to improve them. He forbids us to ‘call any man master upon earth’ [Matt. 23:9]. And as he has forbidden us to submit implicitly to the dictates of any man, so he has also expressly forbid all Christians to assume or usurp any authority over their brethren. “Ye know,” says our blessed Saviour, “that the Princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great, exercise authority upon them: But it shall not be so among you. But whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant, even as the son of man came not to be ministered unto but to minister” (Matt. 20:25-28). How does our Lord upbraid the Scribes and Pharisees who ‘sat in Moses’s seat’ for assuming an unreasonable authority, and affecting more honour and submission than was due to them? The Scribes and Pharisees “love the uppermost rooms at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogues, and greetings in the markets, and to be called of men, Rabbi, Rabbi. But be not ye called Rabbi, for one is your master even Christ; and all ye are brethren” (Matt. 23:6-7). The first propagators of Christianity carefully observed this prohibition. They were meek, humble, and charitable. They claimed no ‘dominion over the faith’ of Christians, but were content with being ‘helpers of their joy’ (2 Cor. 1:24). They ‘preached not themselves to be the Lord’ or Lords, ‘but Christ Jesus,’ and themselves ‘the servants of Christians for Jesus’ sake’ (2 Cor. 4:5). This was the manner in which the holy apostles demeaned themselves in their office. But since their day Ecclesiastics have been for less humility and more power. The style of servants is below their dignity, and they must be called of men Lords, Reverend and Right Reverend Fathers in God, etc. Their fellow Christians and brethren must approach them upon the bended knee. Sovereign princes must think themselves honoured in having the liberty to kiss the toe of an old monk, who calls himself Christ's Vicar. And thus it is that the Pope imitates him who was meek and lowly in heart, and who condescended to wash his disciples’ feet. 

I hope it appears from what has been said that both reason and scripture oppose the claims of those arrogant men who love to lord it over God's heritage and had rather have dominion over our faith, than be helpers of our joy, and that it is the duty of Christians to assert their right of private judgment in religious matters, in opposition to all that are for usurping authority over them. I promised, in the next place, to consider the principal objections against this doctrine. But I believe I need make no apology for deferring this to another opportunity. 

I shall, however, beg leave from what has been said already to look upon the point as proved, and so to close with a few reflections suitable to the subject. 

It appears, then, that all who any ways discourage freedom of inquiry and judgment in religious matters, are, so far forth as they are guilty of this, encroachers upon the natural rights of mankind, that they set up their own authority in opposition to that of almighty God, and that they are enemies to truth and the gospel of Jesus Christ.—They are encroachers upon the natural rights of mankind, because it is the natural right and privilege of every man to make the best use he can of his own intellectual faculties.—They set up their own authority in opposition to that of almighty God, because God has not only given us liberty to examine and judge for ourselves, but expressly required us to do it.—They are enemies to truth and the gospel of Jesus Christ, because free examination is the way to truth, and the gospel, in particular, gains ground the faster the more its doctrines and evidences are examined.—While other tyrants enslave the bodies of men, these throw their chains and fetters upon the mind, which (as the Jews said of themselves) was born free, and which ought not to be in bondage to any man, but only to the Father of Spirits [Heb. 12:9]. If it be asked who these spiritual invaders are, it may be answered: all in general who set themselves up to judge for their neighbours, all who are for imposing their own opinions upon others, all who any ways distress and afflict such as differ from them in their religious sentiments, all who make use of any other weapons besides those of reason and argument in order to demolish error and propagate truth. If a man has a right to judge for himself, certainly no other has a right to judge for him, and to attempt it is to strike at the most valuable interest of a man considered as a reasonable creature. 

Those that are guilty of this crime in the highest degree are such as inflict capital punishments upon those that embrace opinions contrary to their own. The heathens sometimes practised this barbarity among themselves before Christianity made its appearance in the world. Afterwards they united their force against the doctrine of Christ as the most dangerous heresy that had ever been heard of and butchered millions. Scarce had they laid down the practice, when Christians, filled with more than pagan cruelty, took it up and persecuted one another; nor is it quite laid aside to this day in some parts of Christendom. “The mother of harlots,” who has long “made herself drunk with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus,” has still her inquisition and is frequently adding to the number of those whom St. John saw in his vision “under the altar” while they “cried with a loud voice, saying—How long, O Lord, holy and true! dost thou not judge, and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth!” [Rev. 17:5-6; 6:9-10].  

In a somewhat lower degree are they chargeable with the same crime who punish dissenters and nonsubscribers by fines and imprisonments, and by depriving them of those civil privileges, emoluments and honours, which, as good subjects and friends to the state, they might justly expect. It is well known in what church this inhuman practice has been carried to a prodigious length, and in which it is not yet wholly laid aside. It is well that, not Jesus Christ, but another Person, is said to be the supreme Head of this church, for it would be absurd to suppose that he who said his ‘kingdom was not of this world’ [John 18:36] should allow of any such practice among the members of that body of which he is the Head. 

Again: another practice akin to those mentioned above, and which has an apparent tendency to hinder men from judging for themselves, is that of creed-making, setting up human tests of orthodoxy, instead of the infallible word of God, and making other terms of Christian communion than those explicitly pointed out in the gospel. For any man, or any set of men whatever, to do thus is plainly to arrogate to themselves the right of judging for their neighbours and to deter people, as far as they are able, from seeing with their own eyes, and ‘judging even of themselves what is right.’ Indeed this practice is not so criminal as that of persecuting and murdering men for their religious sentiments, for any reasonable man had rather be the object of a thousand anathema's than have his life, or even his temporal substance, taken from him. But still, if these faith-makers I am speaking of are so compassionate as only to ‘give their brethren to the devil’ [1 Tim. 1:20] for not submitting to their doctrines and decrees, even this has some tendency to intimidate them, especially such as are naturally of a weak and pusillanimous make. For when a creed is begun, or eked out with several reverend, ecclesiastical curses, and when it is confidently affirmed, that unless a man believe faithfully every article contained in it, he shall without doubt perish everlastingly, it cannot be supposed that the generality of people should ever have the courage to hesitate in the least concerning the truth of it, although it may be really an affront to common sense, a medley of nonsense and contradiction. Nor are there wanting innumerable instances of persons who have, in this way, been first frighted out of their senses, and then into the belief of the grossest absurdities, and paying a sacred regard to them under the notion of their being orthodox, soul-saving truths and divine mysteries—such as are not to be examined with reason, but to be believed and adored without it. 

It is indeed pretended that all these different methods of keeping men from exercising their own rational faculties are entered upon with a very pious and godly design, with an holy zeal to keep heresies out of the church, to reclaim those that are unsound in the faith and to preserve the Christian verity pure and undefiled. But the proud, domineering, unchristian spirit that has been betrayed by these holy murderers, robbers and faith-imposers leaves us but little room to think that they were actuated by a real concern for the interests of Christianity and the salvation of men's souls. However, to let alone their views and intentions which we have little or nothing to do with, these practices themselves are unjustifiable; they are imperious and tyrannical and contrary to the spirit and doctrines of the gospel. They are an infringement upon those rights of conscience, which ought to be sacred; they have an apparent tendency to prevent all improvements in religious knowledge and to entail ignorance, error, and superstition upon future generations. What improvements can we suppose would have been made in the several arts and sciences comparable to the present had the study of them been encumbered with such restraints and almost insuperable difficulties? 

Let us suppose, for example, that some great monarch a few centuries ago, together with the philosophers of that age, had interposed with their authority in the sciences. Let us suppose that an oath of supremacy to the king or queen had been required and devised in such terms as these: that the king or queen, for the time being, is the supreme head of the society [or church] of philosophers, vested with all power to exercise all manner of philosophical discipline, and other philosophical persons have no manner of jurisdiction philosophical, but by and under the king’s or queen’s most Excellent Majesty, who hath full power and authority to hear and determine all manner of causes philosophical and to reform and correct all philosophical errors, heresies, enormities and abuses whatsoever, within his or her realm. Let us suppose farther that philosophical creeds and articles of faith had been composed and authoritatively issued out with certain minatory and damnatory clauses, and that they had been registered among the other laws of the land. Let us suppose farther that philosophical courts had been erected, where heretics in philosophy, and all non-subscribers to the philosophy by law established, were to be arraigned, harassed, fined, whipped, hanged or burnt. I say, if such measures as these had been entered upon a few centuries ago, must we not suppose that they would have been very absurd and injurious? Must we not suppose that they would have damped the greatest and most enterprising geniuses, and so have been a means of keeping the world in ignorance? Would not this have prevented those valuable improvements in natural knowledge, which the world is blest with at present? Had such methods been taken seasonably, might it not have been heresy still to think this earth a globe, to deny that the sun revolves about us once every twenty-four hours, or to question the equality of the sun and moon? And might not the orthodox philosophy at this day have possibly been that concerning the great cow and tortoise, etc.? In short we cannot think of supporting and propagating the sciences by dint of authority without smiling. And it is equally ridiculous to attempt to propagate religious knowledge and the doctrines of the gospel by authority. And everyone that pleases may easily see what attempts of this nature have usually issued in, and what must necessarily be the effect of them, viz. ignorance and hypocrisy. Error, as well as iniquity, may be established by a law. And when it is so, a man must either subscribe to it, contrary to his sentiments, or seriously embrace it for truth. A sad dilemma when a man is thus forced to be a knave or a fool! Mankind in general seem to be quite indolent enough, backward enough, to examine into moral and religious subjects without those unnatural restraints which are put upon them by the setting up of authority in matters of faith. There are indeed some foolish and conceited men who take a pleasure in being singular in their opinions, and who never suppose they think freely enough, till they are run wild and mad and have rejected everything that others have believed before.    But these instances are not frequent. Men are generally too prone to follow the multitude, to embrace implicitly the tenets of their spiritual instructors, their forefathers, their good mothers and nurses, and to fall in with the opinions of the rich and powerful, which is the road to wealth and preferment. And there is really much more need of encouraging freedom of thought and an inquisitive turn of mind, by handsome gratuities, than there is of keeping people in the old beaten track by the terror of penal laws, gibbets, inquisitions, spiritual courts, and carnal curses. Whatever is pretended, these compulsive methods were not those by which ‘the truth as it is in Jesus’ [Eph. 4:21], was at first propagated and defended; neither can they be of any service to the cause of truth and religion at present. A pecuniary mulct may impoverish a man in this world, but it cannot make him rich in faith, and an heir of the Kingdom.—The rack may torture his limbs, but it cannot draw out the sting from a guilty conscience.—A dark and filthy dungeon may throw us into a mortal distemper, but it cannot bring light and health into our minds and make our souls prosper.—A burning faggot may set our bodies in a light blaze, but it has no tendency to illuminate the understanding. To attempt to dragoon men into sound orthodox Christians   is as unnatural and fruitless as to attempt to dragoon thereinto good poets, physicians or mathematicians. A blow with a club may fracture a man's skull, but I suppose he will not think and reason the more clearly for that, though he may possibly believe the more orthodoxly, according to the opinions of  some. And upon this account it must be confessed that those who make use of these methods to propagate their sentiments act very prudently, for their doctrines are generally such as are much more readily embraced by a man after his brains are knocked out, than while he continues in his senses and of a sound mind. 

I shall conclude with the words of the apostle Paul to Timothy, in which he points out the method of defending and propagating the doctrines of the gospel: “The servant of the Lord” says he, “must not strive, but be gentle unto all men; apt to teach; patient; in meekness, instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth” [2 Tim. 2:24-25].