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Objections Considered Jonathan Mayhew |
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“And
he said also to the people, When ye see a cloud rise out of the west,
straightway ye say, There cometh a shower; and so it is. And when ye
see the south-wind blow, ye say, There will be heat; and it cometh to
pass. Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky, and of the
earth: but how is it, that ye do not discern this time? Yea, and why
even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?” –Luke 12:54-57. Having,
in the preceding discourse, proved the right and duty of free inquiry
and private judgment in matters of religion by direct and plain
arguments both from reason and revelation, there was, perhaps, no
occasion for my exercising your patience any further by entering upon
a consideration of the objections that have been raised against
this doctrine. For no objections can signify anything against a
doctrine once proved true in fact. However, since some men may think
themselves ill used unless their arguments are distinctly considered,
I shall devote the following hour to examine the principal objections
against the doctrine of the foregoing discourse, setting them in the
strongest point of light I am able. The spiritual tyrants and lordly
bigots of the earth have indeed triumphed gloriously, as though
they had gained a mighty victory over freedom of thought, their old
and mortal enemy, and laid her bleeding and gasping at
their feet. But whether these are the triumphs of real heroes, or
only the vain gasconades and Te
Deums of imaginary conquerors, will, perhaps, be easy to determine
when we come to take a view of their weapons and to see the
manner in which they have employed them. I
shall not have much regard to order and method in proposing the
objections now to be considered, but mention them just as they present
themselves to my mind. And, in the first place, it may be
objected, 1.
“That God himself, under the Mosaic dispensation, required
that idolaters and dissenters from the established church should
be punished with death.” From hence it may be argued, “That
uncontrolled liberty in religious matters ought not to be allowed of;
but the true church is obliged in duty to restrain and correct
infidels and schismatics, and all in general that she judges unsound
in the faith.” To this it may be answered, 1st.
That we cannot argue from what was lawful under the Jewish economy
to what is lawful since that is abolished and superseded by another so
different from it as the Christian. There might be, and
doubtless were, some peculiar reasons for authorizing and enjoining
such a discipline then, which do not take place at present.
This might be as peculiar to Judaism as circumcision or
the sacrificing of beasts, etc. And in reality it does not any
more follow from the Jews being commanded to extirpate
idolaters that Christians may destroy heathens and heretics, than it
does from Abraham's being commanded to sacrifice his son that
all parents may and ought to sacrifice their children now. It is to be
remembered that Judaism was at least as much a political as
a religious institution. The Jews
had God for
their immediate king and lawgiver, both in church and
state. Their civil and ecclesiastical polity were
blended together, and, being derived from the same source, every
violation of the law of Moses might be considered and punished
as an offence against the state, in a greater or less degree. And idolatry
being in these circumstances equivalent to high treason, it
is not strange that a capital punishment should be annexed to it. But
the case is much altered since the promulgation of the Christian
religion. (Christ's kingdom is not at all a kingdom of this world. It
is wholly a religious institution. The laws, the penalties, the
rewards of it, are wholly of a spiritual nature; and men are to be won
over to it, and kept in it, only by spiritual and moral means. But
2ndly, If the true church ought to punish such as she
looks upon to be erroneous, heretical or schismatical, then a war must
immediately commence in Christendom,
and continue 'till all are destroyed but one party; for each sect
thinks itself in the right, and that all the rest are tinctured with
heresy. This must certainly be the consequence of this maxim that the
right of using violence and persecution is the prerogative of the true
church—which one would think sufficient to convince any reasonable
man that the maxim is false. Besides, from whence comes this doctrine
that true orthodox Christians have a right to persecute heretics and
unbelievers (i.e., to be more wicked and immoral than
heretics and unbelievers)? The scripture indeed (and experience very
often) teaches us that “those who will live godly in Christ Jesus
must suffer persecution,” but not that they must persecute
others [2 Tim. 3:12]. But perhaps it will be objected in the second place, 2.
“That our Lord himself required his apostles to use external force,
in order to bring men over
to the true faith if gentler methods failed of success.” The
objection will be taken from the parable of the supper, Luke
14. When the guests that were bidden refused the invitation, the
master of the feast is represented as saying to his servant, verse 23,
“Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come
in, that my house may be filled.” “Now as the servant was
commanded to compel the guests to come to the supper, so the
apostles were enjoined to use external violence, if necessary, in
order to bring men over to a belief of the gospel, from whence it
follows that men are not left to their freedom in religious
matters.” The
1st thing I would observe with relation to this objection is
that great caution is necessary in the application of parables and
allegories, lest the similitude should be carried farther than was
originally intended. Nor is it by any means safe to build such a
doctrine (or rather such a practice) as that of compulsion in
religious matters, but upon the most plain and express command. 2ndly,
This parable, at
most, only authorizes the compelling of infidels to embrace the
gospel, and so it has nothing to do with the controversies amongst the
different sects of Christians. 3rdly,
Although it should be allowed that this parable enjoined the inspired
apostles to compel men, by external violence, to embrace
Christianity, it will not follow that uninspired men since, men
who have no commission immediately from heaven, have a right to
do the same. 4thly,
It is to be observed that, according to the parable, the persons to be
compelled are not the same who had before obstinately rejected
the kind invitation given to them, but such as had not yet been sent
to. For when the master sends out his servant a second time to compel
people to come in, it follows—“For I say
unto you that those men who were bidden, shall not taste of my
supper”—so that even according to this parable, those who will not
be persuaded by gentle methods are to be given over, and not to have
any farther means used with them. From whence it follows, 5thly,
That none at all
are to be compelled by external violence, for we cannot suppose that
force should be applied first of all, and before other methods prove
ineffectual, if at all. 6thly,
Either the
apostles did not understand this as a command to use violence in
propagating Christianity or they neglected to obey it, neither of
which can be supposed, had there really been such a command. They
never attempted to use force, but declared, on the contrary, that
‘the weapons of their warfare were not carnal, but mighty through
God to the pulling down of strong holds,’ etc. (2 Cor. 10:4). 7thly,
That this cannot
be the sense of the parable appears from hence, that it is, in the
nature of the thing, impossible to force men really to believe
the gospel and become good Christians, though one had more dragoons
to employ in this pious work, than Louis the XIVth
sent to convert the Huguenots. Faith and repentance are the
work of reason and the spirit of God, and cannot be
wrought in a man by a cudgel, sword, or a gallows. 8thly,
Were this in
itself possible, how could twelve unarmed apostles, who were
allowed to carry only a staff with them in their journeys,
convert the whole world by force of arms? 9thly,
and lastly,
After all the flourish that has been made with this passage by Roman
Catholics and popish Protestants, the word we render
“compel” as often signifies a moral as a physical
compulsion. And the subject here spoken of necessarily determines
it to such a signification in this place. It is as if the master of
the feast had said to his servant, “Since
the persons before invited to my supper [the Jews] refuse to
come, go to others [the Gentile nations] and give them the same
invitation; and use the greatest importunity with them: reason with
them, exhort and persuade them; use all rational methods to convince
them and bring them in.” But I must proceed to another objection, and perhaps one may be urged in some such manner as this— 3.
“If every man is allowed to think and judge for himself, the
consequence will be that many will fall into erroneous and hurtful
opinions. This doctrine opens a door for heresies to enter into the
church; it gives men a liberty to trample upon all our creeds and
confessions of faith, to depart from the doctrines of their pious
forefathers, and to despise their spiritual guides. And what will this
issue in, but the overthrow of all religion?” To this objection I
would answer, 1st.
That it does not
follow from men's being at liberty to judge for themselves, and to
choose their own religion, that they are at liberty to judge wrong and
to reject the true religion, let it be what it will. If they are
obliged to judge and choose for themselves at all, they are obliged to
judge truly and justly, and to reject only what is wrong. The right of
private judgment does not imply that it is indifferent whether a man
judges truly or not, anymore than a man's right of disposing of his
own property implies that he may as innocently squander it away in
rioting and drunkenness, as pay his debts with it or appropriate it to
charitable uses. As a man has not a right to do what is wrong with his
own substance, so neither has he any to judge wrong with his own
understanding. He is under a moral obligation to reject error and to
embrace truth, as far as he is able to detect the former and to
discern the latter. 2ndly,
As the right of
private judgment does not leave men at liberty to judge wrong and to
embrace a false religion, so neither has the exercising that right any
tendency to mislead men, as the objection supposes. The tendency of it
is directly the contrary way. Free examination, weighing arguments for
and against with impartiality, is the way to find the
truth. Who imagines that free inquiry into philosophical subjects has
any tendency to lead men into a wrong idea of the natural world? No
one was ever so infatuated as to assert this. And it is in all
respects as improbable that free inquiry into religious subjects
should lead us into wrong notions concerning the moral world. One
would think that a man who had received his religious principles upon
mature and deliberate consideration, and so had in his own mind
rational arguments to support them, could not have the least
apprehension of their suffering anything by being thoroughly scanned
and examined to the bottom. Error and imposture fly from the light,
like the owl and bat, but truth and honesty, like the
noble eagle,
face to the sun. The cause of error and superstition may suffer by a
critical examination—its security is to lurk in the dark—but the
true religion flourishes the more, the more people exercise their
right of private judgment. This is apparent, and therefore it is no
uncharitableness to suppose that all who are backward to have their
doctrines called in question, and to stand a fair trial at the bar of
impartial reason, have at least some secret suspicion in their own
minds that they will not stand the test and ‘come forth as gold when
it is tried’ [Job 23:10] but be found no better than dross. We
pay but a bad compliment to our religion when we cry out that it is in
danger if men are left to the free exercise of their own rational
faculties in judging of it. A man that is
conscious his cause at court is good chooses it should be tried by the
most severe and critical eye. But he that either knows or suspects he
has a dirty one had much rather that people would spare themselves the
trouble of examining into its merits and take his own word for the
goodness of it. But
3rdly, As to the lamentable havoc which the objection supposes
will be made amongst our creeds and formularies if the doctrine
of free inquiry should prevail, this is, doubtless, a very natural
consequence, for this would probably prove fatal, at least to many
articles contained in them. For it is plain that many of them are
stuffed with the most ridiculous jargon, and are as contrary to
scripture as they are to common sense. But this, instead of being an
objection against free inquiry, is one of the strongest arguments for
it. If these creeds and formularies were true, agreeable to reason and
revelation, the more thoroughly they are examined the better, for then
their truth would appear. But if they are false, it is still best they
should be examined, in order to their being exploded. It is no matter
how old or how new they are. Truth does not die with
age, and then revive again, as is fabled of the phoenix—it
flourishes in immortal youth. Error may indeed become venerable and
gray-headed with length of time, but a falsehood of a
thousand years standing remains as much a falsehood as ever, although
it may have been consecrated by the church and transmitted to
posterity in a creed. Whatever truths it may have had to keep it
company,
and however it may have been preserved amidst the storms that have
beat upon the church, it is only like one of Noah's unclean beasts preserved
in the ark, amongst those of a pure and more useful nature.
There is nothing more foolish and superstitious than a veneration for ancient
creeds and doctrines, as such, and nothing more unworthy a
reasonable creature
than to value principles by their age, as some do their wines.
But indeed this is as common as it is ridiculous. With many
people, “Antiquity! Antiquity!” is the cry, and, “Who will be so
hardy as to dispute the truth of what was believed a thousand years
ago?” just as if what was false formerly were not so still, but
might be ripened and refined by age into a doctrine of grace. Most
things are, indeed, changed by time. Time makes the child a
man. Time makes the ignorant wise. Time often turns a
friend into a foe, and foe into a friend. ‘The fashion of the world
passeth away’ [1 John 2:17] by time. And time shall
change the whole face of nature. But truth, like the “Father of
lights” is without “variableness, or shadow of turning” [James
1:17]. To
proceed, 4thly,
It is supposed in the last mentioned objection that freedom of inquiry
will naturally bring our spiritual guides into contempt and
weaken their authority. To this I reply that it cannot possibly be of
any disadvantage to the sober and rational part of the clergy,
but has a tendency to make them more esteemed. But as to the vain and
proud, the ignorant and assuming, the enthusiastic and superstitious,
it has doubtless a natural tendency to bring these into contempt—and
the sooner the better, that so they may not have so much power to do
mischief. These are the persons that are generally the most averse to
people's seeing and judging for themselves, and the reason why they
are so is too apparent to need mentioning. But 5thly, and
lastly, Upon supposition that the cause of truth and real religion
might suffer in some respects by persons exercising their right of
private judgment, yet this is no just reason for denying them such a
liberty. This right is given them by God and nature, and the gospel of
Christ, and no man has a right to deprive another of it, under a
notion that he will make an ill use of it and fall into erroneous
opinions. We may as well pick our neighbour's pocket, for fear he
should spend his money in debauchery, as take from him his right of
judging for himself and choosing his religion, for fear he should
judge amiss and abuse his liberty. But
I must hasten to another objection, which is frequently urged with a
great deal of confidence, and very little reason. It is near akin to
that last mentioned and may be put into some such form as this: 4.
“If all are left at liberty to choose their own religion, and to
enjoy it unmolested, we shall have innumerable sects springing
up amongst us, which tends to confusion and destroys the peace
and unity of the church. It is therefore expedient that the governors
of the church should enjoin upon all the belief of certain
articles of faith, and the observation of certain modes and rites of
worship. Without some common rule of faith, worship and discipline
beyond what the scriptures contain, there can be no sufficient bond of
union amongst Christians, and so the church must inevitably be
crumbled to pieces, whereas there ought to be no schism in that
spiritual body.” With relation to this objection, I would
observe, 1st.
That if any rule
of faith, worship, and discipline, besides that which our Saviour and
his apostles have left us, be necessary in order to the peace and good
government of the church, then the church had no peace and was not
well governed during the apostolic age. For Christians had then no
common rule of faith, worship, and discipline besides that which they
received from our Lord himself, or his apostles, who were under the
extraordinary influence and direction of his spirit, which rule is
transmitted to us in the writings of the New Testament
and is sufficient now, for the regulation of the church, if it
was then. That this was sufficient then, is not denied, and therefore
it cannot be deficient at present. But 2ndly, If any
farther regulations had been necessary in order to preserve the peace
and unity of the church, it is strange that neither our blessed
Saviour, who “loved the church and gave himself for it” [Eph.
5:25], nor the apostles, who lived and died in the service of the
church, should have taken more care to provide for its peace and
prosperity. Can we suppose that they did their work to the halves, and
left others to finish and perfect it? 3rdly,
Who gave the governors of the church any authority in matters of
faith, worship, and discipline? Do we find one word of it in
scripture? No. The church of Christ, as such, has no legislator
besides Christ himself, whom the Father “has made head over all
things to the church” [Eph. 1:22]. And whatever church that be whose
rulers have any power of legislation, so far forth it is not the
church of Christ, for Christ equally forbids all his disciples to
assume authority over their brethren, and to submit to any who shall
arrogate to themselves any authority in matters of a religious
concern. 4tbly,
and lastly, As
no order of men has any authority to enjoin the belief of any articles
of faith, or the use of any modes of worship, not expressly and
explicitly pointed out in the scriptures, so neither has the enjoining
any such a tendency to preserve the peace and harmony of the church,
but directly the contrary. The confusion and disorder that have
hitherto been in the church have not arisen from Christians exercising
their own judgment and worshiping God according to their consciences
(though in a manner somewhat different from others), but from the
pride and insolence of those who deny their Christian brethren this
liberty, and who undertake to prescribe authoritatively to others what
they shall believe and how they shall worship. Were it not for the
turbulent, domineering spirit of some Ecclesiastics, who desire more
power than Christ saw fit to entrust them with, there would be but
little of that wrangling and discord which have hitherto disturbed the
peace of the church. The divisions and contentions that have hitherto
happenned, and still subsist in the Christian church, are all, in a
manner, owing to the unchristian temper and conduct of those who could
not content themselves with scripture orthodoxy, with the
simple and spiritual worjhip of the Father, enjoined by our
Saviour, and with the platform of church discipline contained
in the New Testament, but must go to coining new articles of faith,
new modes and rites of worship, making new canons, and prescribing new
rules for the regulation of the church. It is about these
comparatively novel inventions that the governors and “fathers of
the church” (as some affest to call them) have generally been
more warm and zealous than about an holy and godly life. They have
ordinarily given pretty good quarter to the most vicious and debauched
of men, provided their own authority was acknowledged, their own
peculiar whimsies embraced, and their decent (or rather
ridiculous) forms and ceremonies were religiously
observed. But the most peaceable, sober and virtuous persons, who
would not submit to their tyrannical yoke, have all along been created
with contempt and inhumanity, as being heretics, schismatics, etc. And
all this perhaps only for not practising such rites as have no more
relation to Christianity than telling beads, or cracking the
fingers, and for not believing such doctrines as have no more to
do with the gospel of Jesus Christ than the idle stories of Bel and
the Dragon, or Tobit and his dog. Here is the true source
of religious discord. Had Ecclesiastics, instead of ‘lording it over
God's heritage’ [1 Pet. 5:3] and setting up their own authority in
the room of Christ's, put on “the meekness and gentleness of
Christ” [2 Cor. 10:1] and set a better ‘example to the flock,’
had they endeavoured to remove “all stumbling blocks” [Matt.
13:41] out of the way, instead of insisting upon indifferent things as
necessary terms of Christian communion, had they taught and practised
“the weightier matters of law” [Matt. 23:23], instead of
spending their zeal upon trifles, had they taught mutual forbearance
and charity, instead of fomenting a furious party spirit and exciting
ignorant bigots to rail at sober peaceable Christians—had they done
thus, the peace and harmony of the church might have been very well
preserved, without creeds and formularies or an exact uniformity in faith and worship. Our blessed Saviour and his
apostles, it is plain, have left matters so that there may be a
considerable latitude and difference in the sentiments of good
Christians, and in the manner of their worship. But His ambassadors,
and their successors, it seems, have found out that this is a
great defect. Accordingly they undertake to supply it, under the
notion of preserving the peace of the church. And this is what has
hitherto been, and must continue to be, the cause of angry debates and
endless contentions, a means of dividing the church, instead of
uniting it, and of inspiring Christians with mutual rage, instead of
mutual love and brotherly affection. It
may be objected, in the fifth place, 5.
“That the doctrine of private judgment is inconsistent with that of
a standing ministry in the Christian church, appointed by Christ to
instruct people in religious matters. An order of men was
divinely instituted to do the office of instructors, or teachers,
in the church. Consequently there must be others whose duty it is
to learn of them and not
to pretend to a right of
judging for themselves. It is incumbent upon the Laity to go to
their spiritual guides and to receive their instructions with humility
and reverence, without pretending to dispute the truth of what they
assert in the name of the Lord.” This, we know, is the manner in
which many express themselves upon this subject. And the positive,
dogmatical air with which most of our pulpit discourses are delivered
is a sufficient proof that these sentiments are adopted by the
generality of those that style themselves the “ambassadors of Jesus
Christ.” But to this objection it may be answered in the first
place, 1st.
That, allowing
there is somewhere in the Christian church a set of men whose office
it is to teach authoritatively and by divine right, still people must
judge for themselves who these men are. Almost all public
teachers of religion pretend a divine right to be so. But they do not
all teach the same doctrines. How then shall we know whom to choose
for our spiritual instructor, without examining into, and judging
upon, the claims of those who demand our attention, and the direction
of our understandings and consciences? But
2ndly, Supposing we have found who these persons are, to whom
this authority is given, it does not follow that they are to be implicitly
believed in everything they say, or even in any thing. No man is
to be believed implicitly, unless he is infallible, but infallibility
is not necessarily connected with a divine right to teach. Although it
should be allowed that kings reign by divine right, in the highest
sense pleaded for by the advocates for passive obedience and non-resistance,
still it is possible that they may make an ill use of their power,
command things expressly forbidden by God, and forbid what God has
enjoined. In either of these cases, it will be allowed that they have
no title to the active obedience of their subjects. So also, he that
has a divine right to instruct others in religion may possibly speak
false, either ignorantly or with design; and if he does so, no one
will be so extravagant as to say that he ought to be believed. God has
given him a right to teach, but it is only to teach truth; if
therefore he ‘teaches for doctrines the commandments of men’
[Matt. 15:9] and lies, for the gospel of Christ, he exceeds his
commission and has no more right to demand our assent than any other
liar or deceiver, who is unconsecrated. So that let us carry
our idea of the authority of Christian teachers ever so high, yet if
we stop short of infallibility, we are in reason obliged to examine
all that they say, and either to receive or reject it as evidence of
its truth does or does not appear. Even the apostles themselves (who
were divinely-authorized teachers in a much higher and more proper
sense than any set of men can pretend to be at this day) never
pretended to such a right of dictating to others what they should
believe and do, as interfered with the right of private judgment.
Christian teachers in after ages are (or at least ought to be) only commentators
upon the scriptures, and we cannot suppose their commentaries have
greater weight and authority than the text itself. A
man of superior knowledge and integrity may be of great advantage in a
Christian society by helping his brethren and neighbours to a right
understanding of the scriptures, although he be not infallible, and
although nothing he advances is to be deceived for truth without
examination and proof. We have authorized professors and
teachers of law, physics, philosophy, etc., who
are doubtless helpful to such as devote themselves to the study of
these sciences. But who ever imagined that the end of their
institution was authoritatively to dictate what is true in their
respective provinces in such a sense as to preclude examination and to
render it unnecessary for their pupils and auditors to enquire into
the foundation of what they assert? This is so far from being the
case, that ’tis confessed their chief business is to open and
enlarge the minds of their scholars, to propose reasons and arguments
to their understandings and to endeavour to make them apprehend their
force, and in this way to bring them acquainted with the sciences to
which they respectively
apply themselves. A mathematician would think his pupil had
made but a small proficiency if he only believed, upon authority, all
the propositions in Euclid and other books of the same kind,
without seeing what principles they were grounded upon, or being able
to demonstrate them himself. And as the business of an instructor is
not to enforce certain dogma's purely by dint of authority, so the
business of a learner is not to receive for truth whatever his
instructor, in any science, advances as such, but to exercise his own
intellectual powers and to enter into the reasons and grounds of what
is taught, and to receive nothing without evidence. No one imagines
that a person's exercising his own understanding in this manner is
inconsistent with the notion of his having somebody to lead and
instruct him in any branch of natural knowledge. And the case is much
the same in morals and religion. A man’s being an authorized (if you
please, a divinely authorized) instructor in religious matters
is no ways inconsistent with the right of private judgment in others.
Indeed if they reject the truth when it is sufficiently proved, they
do it at their peril; and that, let it be offered by whom it
will. But still all are left at as much liberty to examine and judge
for themselves, as if there were no public teachers at all. I
proceed now to the sixth and last objection I shall have time to
consider. The objection I intend may be put in some such form as this— 6.
“Although men may be at liberty to judge for themselves and to
choose their own religion, when
the civil magistrate does not interpose with his authority, yet
when articles of faith have once
received a royal sanction, and a particular religion is established by
the laws of the land, then certainly we are bound to dismiss all our
former scruples of conscience and to submit to the religion of the
state. For the apostle has told us expressly that “the powers
that be are ordained of God,” that “he that resisteth the power,
resisteth the ordinance of God, and shall receive to himself
damnation,” etc. [Rom. 13:1-2]. With
respect to this objection, I would beg leave to query in the first place
whether Christians are bound in conscience to believe and conform to
that religion, whatever it be, which is established by law
in the countries where they respectively live? This is a plain
question, and they either are or are not so obliged. There is no
medium. If they are not so obliged, but only in case they apprehend
the established religion is agreeable to the word and will of God,
this supposes a right of private judgment, and so gives up the whole
point in debate. But on the other hand, if they are bound in
conscience to conform in the manner before expressed, from hence it
follows that he that lives in Scotland is bound in conscience to be a
Presbyterian, he that lives in England to be an Episcopalian, he that lives in Italy, France, Spain
or Portugal to be a Roman Catholic, he that lives in Constantinople
must be a Mahometan, and he that lives in a Heathen country must
conscientiousiy comply with all the idolatrous rites that are enjoined
by the civil authority, and so be an Heathen in order to obey the
gospel-precept concerning submission to lawful authority.
Moreover, upon this supposition, it follows that a traveler who has
occasion to pass through all those different countries, must change
his religion with his climate. He must successively be a Presbyterian,
Episcopalian, Papist, Muslim and a Heathen,
and then be a good orthodox believer when he comes into
Christendom again. These consequences are unavoidable upon
supposition that the subject ought universally to embrace the religion
of the supreme magistrate. And some men will not be shocked at these
consequences, for nothing pleases them better than to change their
religion as often as they can with conveniency and profit. Oaths and
subscriptions are, with them, of no signification; if “they swear to
their own hurt” [Psalm 15:4], it is but to change. They are
governed by the fashion in their religion, as much as they are in the
cut of their clothes; they have none but a state conscience, and
either rail or smile at those who are so whimsical and superstitious
as to pretend to have any other. What they have to do in order to know
the true religion is not to inquire into the nature of things and the
infallible oracles of God,
but to search the Codes and Registers and Lawbooks in
the country where they live.
However, it is to be hoped that some others do not trifle with
their Maker in this manner, but think it of some importance to know
the will of God and to obey it conscientiously, whatever may be the
religion by law established. Is it not possible for the command of the
civil magistrate to
interfere and clash with the laws of God? No man will pretend to deny
this. Whose authority then is to be regarded—that of
the king, or that of the Monarch of the universe, the King of Kings
and Lord of Lords? Will any man say it is not our business as men, and
especially as Christians, to judge whether the injunctions
of the civil magistrate may be complied with confidently with our
allegiance and loyalty to the supreme Majesty of heaven and earth? And
if they cannot, will any one make it a serious question ‘whether it
is better to obey God or man?’ [Acts 5:29]. But
2ndly, I would humbly inquire how any civil magistrate came by
any authority at all in religious matters, and who gave him this
authority? Has the supreme magistrate of every nation, as such, a
right to make a religion for his subjects? No, for then a heathen
magistrate would have a right to enjoin idolatry and paganism and to
punish all Christians that came within his territories, if they would
not conform. Does the gospel of Christ give the Christian magistrate
authority in matters of faith and worship? No. It says not a word
about any such thing. But
3rdly, and lastly here, It is evident beyond all dispute
that the apostle, in enjoining obedience to the civil magistrate, had
no thought of enjoining obedience to him in religious matters, for all
the supreme magistrates then in the world were Pagan, and
idolatry was the religion by law established. And certainly we cannot
suppose that the apostles could enjoin it as a Christian duty to
embrace the established religion, when that was directly opposite to
Christianity. To have threatened damnation to those who disobeyed in
this case, would have been to threaten damnation to themselves and to
denounce an anathema against all the Christians in the world, and even
against Jesus Christ himself, for these were all dissenters from the
established religion, and thousands gloriously suffered martyrdom for
refusing to comply with the religion of the state and for asserting
that right of private judgment which we are now endeavouring to
defend. According
to St. Paul, the magistrate ‘is ordained of God for a terror to
evildoer, and for a praise to them that do well’ [Rom. 13:4]. His
office is to preserve the liberties and natural rights of his
subjects, one of the most important of which rights is that of private
judgment, and an unmolested enjoyment of a man's own religion, let it
be what it will, provided he is a peaceable subject and a good member
of society. These and such like are the ends for which, according to
scripture, the magistrate is ordained of God, and not to make a
religion for his subjects. This would be to invade, and encroach upon,
those natural rights of his subjects, which it is his business to
preserve inviolable. As the Jews said occasionally to Pilate,
“We have no king but Caesar” [John 19:15], so Christians, as such,
may say, “We have no king but Jesus Christ,” and they are traitors
to him their lawful sovereign if they swear allegiance to any
other as the lord of their faith and the director of their religious
conduct. And indeed the very mention of articles of faith
established by law is as great a solecism as mathematics
established by law and deserves a worse name than I choose to give
in this place. Thus
I have endeavoured with all possible brevity and plainness to answer
the most material objections against freedom of thought and the rights
of conscience in religious concerns. I have aimed at provoking no sect
of Christians whatever,
nor at pleasing any, but have spoken my sentiments, such as they are,
with the honest simplicity that I think becomes a Christian, and with
such freedom as I
apprehend is agreeable to the cause I have been attempting to defend:
the cause of religious liberty, that liberty which God and the
gospel of his Son have granted to us, that liberty, for the sake of
which our pious forefathers forsook their native land, where they had
a goodly heritage and sought
a safe retreat in this Western world, a wilderness inhabited by savage beasts and more savage men, though
both were less savage than some of those episcopal blood-thirsty
tyrants from whose rage they fled. This is a cause of no less
importance even to the present happiness of human society than that of
civil liberty in opposition to arbitrary power. And here I beg leave
to use the words of a truly catholic prelate of the church of
England—“To liberty and property,” says he, “I add the
free exercise of religion as necessary to the happiness of a governed
society, because as there is no tyranny so odious to God as tyranny
over the conscience, so is there no slavery so uneasy and ignominious
as a forced religion or a worship imposed upon…men by the fear or application of outward inconveniencies, besides
that nothing promotes the flourishing condition of a nation more than
the indulgence of this freedom to all whose principles are not
manifestly inconsistent
with the public safety.” Thus the Bishop of Winchester, the
noted scourge of civil and eccleliastical tyranny. I
shall now close with a few words by way of application. And
1st, Let us all “stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ
has made us free,” and not suffer ourselves to be “entangled with
any yoke of bondage” [Gal. 5:1]. If we have submitted to the yoke
hitherto and ingloriously subjected ourselves to any human impositions
in religious matters, it is better to throw off the yoke even now,
than to let it gall us all our lifetime; it is not yet too late to
assert our liberty and free ourselves from an ignominious slavery to
the dictates of men. Let
us take pains to find out the truth, and after we are settled in our
judgment concerning any religious tenet or practice, adhere to it with
constancy of mind, ’till convinced of our error in a rational way.
Let us despise the frowns and censures of those vain conceited men who
set themsclves up for the oracles of truth and the standard of
orthodoxy, and then call their neighbours hard names—We have not only a right to think for ourselves in matters of
religion, but to act for ourselves also. Nor has any man whatever,
whether of a civil or sacred character, any authority to
control us, unless it be by the gentle methods of argument and
persuasion. To Christ alone, the supreme and only head of the
Christian Church, and the final judge of mankind—to him alone we are
accountable for not believing his doctrines and obeying his
commandments, as such. And whosoever attempts to restrain or control
us takes it upon him to rule another man’s servants, forgetting
that he also is a man under authority and must hereafter stand
or fall by a sentence from the same mouth with ourselves. Did I say we have a right to judge and ask for ourselves? I now add—it is our indispensable duty to do it. This is a right which we cannot relinquish, or neglect to exercise if we would, without being highly culpable, for it is absolutely unalienable in its own nature. We may dispose of our temporal substance if we please, but God and nature and the Gospel of Christ enjoin it upon us a duty to maintain the right of private judgment and to worship God according to our consciences, as much as they enjoin us to give an alms to the poor, to love God and our neighbour, and practise universal righteousness; and we may as well talk of giving up our right to the latter as the former. They are all duties, and not rights simply—duties equally founded in the reason of things, duties equally commanded by the same God, duties equally enjoined by the same Lord, duties equally required in the same gospel. And a neglect of the duty of private judgment may possibly be attended with worse consequences to ourselves and others than the neglect of almost any other. For he that does not examine for himself what is true and right, asks entirely in the dark, and so may run into the most irregular and destructive practices that can be conceived of, just as his weak or wicked guides are pleased to prompt him. He is fit only for a tool to the devil and his emissaries, and may flatter himself that he is doing God good service, while he is imbruing his hands in the blood of the innocent and persecuting the church of Christ. But
2ndly, and to conclude, while we are asserting our own liberty
and Christian rights, let us be consistent and uniform, and not
attempt to encroach upon the rights of others. They have the
same right to judge for themselves and to choose their own religion,
with ourselves. And nothing is more incongruous than for an advocate
for liberty to tyrannize over his neighbours. We have all liberty to
think and ask for ourselves in things of a religious concern; and we
ought to be content with that, without desiring a liberty to oppress
and grieve others. However, we have some ignorant railing zealots
amongst us, fired with a furious party spirit, who are not satisfied
that they enjoy their own liberty, but mourn that their neighbours
enjoy the same, and that they have it not in their power to assist
them for their righteous sentiments. They groan under the righteous act
of toleration as much as our fathers groaned under the unrighteous
one of uniformity. However,
through mercy, we have but a few men of this stamp amongst us, and
those are such ignorant and despicable creatures that they are more
proper objects of pity than of anger. My brethren, God forbid that we should discover any thing of this same unchristian
temper, or begrudge others the enjoyment of those rights which we
ourselves esteem so dear, sacred and valuable. Let us, “as much as
in us lies, live peaceably with all men” [Rom. 12:18], but suffer
none to lord it over our consciences. Let us avoid a contracted,
censorious spirit in ourselves, and pity and despise it in others. Let
us be courteous and friendly to all men of what denomination soever
they be and how much soever their religious principles may differ from
our own. If we think them erroneous, let us not rail at them, but
reason with them in the spirit of meekness. Let us use no methods but
those of sober argument and kind persuasion, in order to bring men
over to a belief and practice of “the truth as it is in Jesus,”
and let us scorn those who are for using any other methods with us.
God grant that how different soever our sentiments are, we may be
united in love and charity, and that Christians of all persuasions,
and all churches, may live and behave in such a manner as to meet at
last above and join in the “general assembly and church of the
first-born which are written in heaven” [Heb. 12:23]. Amen. |
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©2005
American Unitarian Conference™