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'The Latest Form of Infidelity' Examined

George Ripley

A Letter to Mr. Andrews Norton, occasioned by his Discourse before the Association of the Alumni of the Cambridge Theological School on the 19th of July, 1839, by an alumnus of the school.

(unabridged version)

The following letter is a critique of Andrews Norton's discourse on "The Latest Form of Infidelity," which attacked the Transcendentalist idea that the truth of Christianity is revealed most powerfully to the individual human heart, and that belief in Jesus' miracles is optional. In this whopping 160-page letter, which was originally published anonymously, Ripley scolds Norton for abandoning the inclusive principle of liberal Christianity and criticizes Norton's assertion that Christianity is grounded only on miracles and nothing else.  

 

“Our guides must direct us, and yet if they fail, God hath not so left us to them, but he hath given us enough to ourselves, to discover their failings and our own duties. It is best to follow our guides, if we know nothing better; but if we do, it is better to follow the pillar of fire than a pillar of cloud, though both possibly may lead to Canaan—but then also it is possible that it may be otherwise.”—Jeremy Taylor.

Dear Sir,

The occasion, as you justly observe, which called forth your Discourse before the "Alumni of the Cambridge Theological School," was one of more than common interest. It was the first anniversary of an Association composed of ministers whose principal bond of union is personal respect and friendship, who are united by the sympathies of education and of devotion to similar pursuits, but who neither claim authority over each others' faith, nor profess to regard uniformity of speculative opinion as desirable, even if it were possible. Many of them have been fellow students at the same school; a common interest in theology first brought them together and has not since divided them, others are connected by habits of social and professional intercourse, and all, it is to be presumed, are engaged in the investigation of truth without being restrained by a creed which they have agreed to support.

The relation existing between the clergymen who were assembled on that day has often been remarked as being of a rare and delightful character. It has been supposed that there were few bodies of men in the habit of meeting together who combined more firmness of individual opinion with more guarded and delicate respect for every sincere expression of thought, who were more attached to the principle of perfect tolerance in matters of intellectual inquiry, or more consistent in its practical application, and who had more thoroughly learned the great lesson of wisdom, "in our own strivings after truth to give deserved honor to the strivings of our neighbor." In consequence of this, their mutual intercourse has been agreeable and salutary; they have shed light on each others’ minds, they have warmed each others' hearts, the progress of truth has been advanced by their mutual endeavors, and it is seldom, indeed, that the widest differences of opinion have produced any interruption in the perfect bond of charity by which they are united. It is to be expected, of course, that men whose education, whose habits of mind, whose condition and pursuits in life are, in many respects very similar, should arrive at certain common conclusions in their independent researches after truth. This has, undoubtedly, been the case. They agree in the rejection of many articles of faith which have usually been held sacred in the Church; a traditional theology has taken no strong hold of their minds. They deem the simple truths of Christianity more important than the mysteries which have been combined with them, but the principle of their union has never been made to consist in any speculative belief; no test has been required as a condition of fellowship. The mere suggestion of such a course would be met only with a smile of derision. It is not as Unitarians that they are united in friendly relations; those relations existed before the name of Unitarian was prevalent among us, and it is now disclaimed by many whom we can never think of but with sentiments of profoundest veneration and love. The common tie which holds them together is attachment to liberal Christianity; they value this because it connects the enjoyment of religion with independence of mind and enables them to search for truth, free from human dictation.

It must always be a beautiful spectacle to witness the union of a numerous body of men whose relation with each other is so disinterested and holy. When we remember those disastrous ages of the Church—so full of instruction and warning to the thoughtful student of history—in which councils assembled for the punishment of heresy, in which the questioner of prevailing opinions was doomed to expiate his crime by the fires of martyrdom or to drag out a death-like existence under the ban of the hierarchy, it cannot but be grateful to meet with an assembly of clergymen who, in the consciousness that they are ecclesiastics, do not forget that they are men, who are more anxious to maintain a true liberty of thought than any uniformity of creed, and who labor for the regeneration of society and the blessedness of the world by the diffusion of the essential spirit of Christianity, rather than by the inculcation of the doctrines of a sect.

The Association, moreover, which you were called to address, is composed of the Alumni of a Theological School which has always claimed the favor of the community, on account of its freedom from an exclusive spirit, its confidence in the safety and utility of thorough inquiry in all matters of faith, its attachment to the principles of a liberal theology, and its renunciation of the desire to impose articles of belief on the minds of its pupils. The strongest plea on which it has relied for patronage has been expressed in language like the following: "It is not the variety of opinions which have been drawn from the same records of faith, nor the number of sects into which the Church universal has been partitioned, which have been injurious to the Christian cause, so much as the manner in which those opinions have been maintained, and the outrageous pretensions which those sects have, with hardly an exception, advanced. The lovers of a free or liberal theology feel it impossible that they could submit to any such dominion. They know it to be not in the nature of things that any man can be worthy of all this deference, or can be entitled to have all his opinions respected and adopted as infallible interpretations of an infallible law. They know of no mere man who ever lived by whose name they would be willing to be called, or whose implicit disciples they would be willing to be considered. They refuse the name of Socinus with as much promptness as they would the name of Calvin, not because they are afraid of being thought to hold those opinions of Socinus which have been generally accounted obnoxious, but because they conceive no man to be worthy of the honor which they render to Christ alone, and because they will not bind themselves, nor suffer themselves to be bound by the adoption of any man's name, to become in any degree responsible for his character or sentiments, subservient to his views, or obedient to his dictates. The submission which they will not yield to one man, they will not yield to any one body of men. They feel that they cannot and must not surrender the birthright of their mental and religious freedom to one or to many, to a name, or a church, or a catechism, but that they must keep their minds open at all hours to receive fresh air and new light, and in a position to profit readily and unrestrainedly by the result of any examination. Entertaining such views as these of the sacredness of religious freedom, they would never call on the instructors of a school of theology to subscribe allegiance to a long list of doctrines, but would rather select those men for teachers who, wise, honest, and competent, would  refuse bondage, even as they themselves would refuse it. A liberal theology is generous as well as free. It will no more attempt to enslave than it will submit to be enslaved. It allows all Christian privileges to all Christian men, and it acknowledges as Christian men all who seriously take the name of Christ, hearken to his instructions, and consider themselves amenable to his laws. It does not take a particular form of doctrine, and place it on a pedestal, and proclaim, 'This is the golden image; fall down and worship it, or be cast into the fiery furnace.' It reveres truth, it entertains its own views of what truth is, and it would have all men come to the knowledge of it, but it would effect this by invitation, and not by denunciation, by persuading men to examine, leaving them free to choose, and granting to each one his perfect right to his own determination and his perfect safety in it, if he has come to it in a proper temper and by a just use of all his means. It regards spiritual pride and arrogance as worse than false doctrine, and as the prolific seed of heresies and schisms and infidelity. Exclusiveness is its utter aversion. Exclusive Christianity is its unspeakable wonder. It regards exclusive religion as quite as great a contradiction as an exclusive God…. I believe that in the whole of the Western Continent, from its southernmost cape to the northern circle, there is but one spot, a green spot, in which such a theology is publicly taught. I believe that in one theological seminary only, in this hemisphere, the Divinity School at Cambridge, do religious liberality and charitableness, conjointly with seriousness, form the spirit of theological instruction."[1]

In the hope that the Cambridge Theological School would be true to these momentous obligations, would answer to the piercing cry of our country and age for a free and generous theology, would be a tower of safety and strength against every foe of mental liberty, we have loved it with an exceeding love. Her name has been written on the very palms of our hands; they would sooner forget their cunning than we could forget her welfare. She had taught us to search boldly, though meekly and reverently, into the mysteries of God and the mind of Christ; we took pleasure in her stones and even honored her dust; we valued her reputation, her influence, her usefulness, as if it had been our own; we looked to her, perhaps with exaggerated, yet with pardonable, confidence as the great hope of a progressive theology in our native land, as the fountain from which a bright and benignant light would radiate beyond the mountains of New England and shine upon the broad and pleasant meadows of the West. This feeling has been shared in common with almost all our clergymen. We have endeavored to diffuse it in our societies; it has kindled the enthusiasm of our most noble-minded young men, our opulent citizens have not escaped its influence, and nearly the whole of our religious community have regarded the School at Cambridge as their favorite child.

It must be a privilege, under any circumstances, to address an audience composed in this manner. The occasion, it would seem, could not but lift one above the region of vulgar trivialities, awaken thoughts of a deep and solemn character, cleanse the mind from every taint of prejudice, and suppress all consciousness of self in devotion to truth and freedom. I do not wonder that the interest of the occasion was deeply and widely felt, that it called together a numerous company of brothers and friends, such as seldom honors the festive assemblages of our University. This interest was still further enhanced by the fact that, in accordance with their character as liberal ministers, they had arrived at different conclusions in regard to several important topics of theology. In our happy state of society, as there is no very broad line of distinction between the clergy and the rest of the community, they had shared in the influences which, within the last few years, have acted so strongly on the public mind. With intelligent and reflecting men of every pursuit and persuasion, many of them had been led to feel the necessity of a more thorough reform in theology. They were not satisfied that the denial of the Trinity and its kindred doctrines gave them possession of all spiritual truth; they wished to press forward in the course which they had begun, to ascend to higher views, to gain a deeper insight into Christianity, to imbibe more fully its divine spirit and to apply the truths of revelation to the wants of society and progress of man.

Their experience as pastors had brought them into contact with a great variety of minds, some of which were dissatisfied with the traditions they had been taught; the religion of the day seemed too cold, too lifeless, too mechanical for many of their flock. They were called to settle difficulties in theology of which they had not been advised in the school. Objections were presented by men of discernment and acuteness, which could not be set aside by the learning of books. It was discovered that many had become unable to rest their religious faith on the foundation of a material philosophy, and that a new direction must be given to their ideas, or they would be lost to Christianity, and possibly to virtue.    The wants of such minds could not be concealed. They were known to the ministers, if not to the world; to neglect them would have been a sin. The wandering sheep in the wilderness excited more interest than the ninety and nine which were safe in the fold, and to restore them to the good shepherd was counted a paramount duty.

In the course of the inquiries which they had entered into, for their own satisfaction and the good of their people, they had become convinced of the superiority of the testimony of the soul to the evidence of the external senses. The essential character of Christianity, as a principle of spiritual faith, of reliance on the Universal Father, and of the intrinsic equality and brotherhood of man, was made more prominent than the historical circumstances with which it was surrounded, at its introduction into the world; and the signatures of truth and divinity which it bore on its front were deemed stronger proofs of its origin with God than even the works of might which were wrought by its Author for the benefit of man. They cherished a firm and sincere conviction of the importance of these views, and their adaptation to the peculiar wants and highest interests of the community. They never disguised the results to which they had come; they gave them a due proportion of attention in their public services, they rejoiced in their discussion, even when it was called forth by rude attacks, though sometimes misunderstood they were not discouraged, they knew the community they lived in, which will not suffer a good man to be put down, and with a calm confidence in truth, they were content to wait for the prevalence of their views. They regarded them as the natural result of liberal inquiry in theology, chastened and purified by the influence of religious sentiment and guided by the lights of an elevated spiritual philosophy. In the exercise of their ministry, they had been confirmed in the soundness of their ideas, their benign effects were visible among the people of their charge, and these effects were thought to be in harmony with the spirit of Christ, nay, the necessary product of the religion which he announced. They saw their opinions rapidly spreading among the younger members of the profession, while they were regarded with charity, if not with approbation, by those whom they most honored among their seniors. No difference of speculation had estranged them from the hearts of their brethren; no breach had been made in the sympathy which was the pervading principle of their association. The understanding had been sacredly observed, if not formally expressed, that a profession of faith in Christ, and a sincere and virtuous character, were the conditions of fellowship, rather than any agreement in theological opinion.

Such were the circumstances in which the Alumni assembled to hear the first annual Discourse before their Association. It was to be expected that the speaker on such an occasion would either confine himself to those topics which were of equal interest to all, on which there was no prominent diversity of opinion, or that, if he chose to select a subject of controversy, he would discuss it not merely with a semblance of calmness and moderation, but with a manly adherence to the great principles of liberal Christianity and a scrupulous sense of justice towards the sentiments and character of his brethren.

In this respect, the Discourse which was pronounced appears to me not only at variance with the spirit of the occasion, but adapted to mislead the public mind on subjects which deeply interest it. A temperate, though firm and decided, examination of its statements is called for by the claims of truth and justice, the cause of mental freedom, and a regard to the progress of liberal theology and enlightened religion in our community.

I am impelled by these considerations to submit your Discourse to the test of an impartial criticism; and in the discharge of this duty, you will pardon me if I speak with great frankness if I endeavor to be as faithful in pointing out your errors, as I am sure you would have been towards another in similar circumstances. I shall avoid all harshness of expression, for my object is not triumph, but truth. Still I am aware that you cannot read my remarks without pain, and I therefore protest, in the outset, against the severity with which I shall handle your assertions being construed into discourtesy towards yourself. It is unpleasant to speak as I shall be forced to, but it will be remembered that the subject of controversy is not merely a speculative opinion, but involves a vindication from the charge of grave moral offense.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the leading topic of your Discourse, you will allow me to express my disapprobation of the peculiar form which you were pleased to adopt for the communication of your sentiments. I object to it, not merely as a matter of taste—though much might be said in that regard—but as adapted to make a false impression, which it is more difficult to set right than if your manner of treating the subject had been simple and direct. The point I allude to will appear in a moment.

You commence with the assertion (p. 4.) that “our religion is very imperfectly understood, and received by comparatively a small number with intelligent faith.” You then announce as the theme of your Discourse (p. 5.) “the characteristics of the times and some of those opinions now prevalent, which are at war with a belief in Christianity.” This, certainly, was a judicious opening, and I only speak the sentiments of your whole audience when I say that it was heard with universal pleasure. It at once brought up subject of the highest importance, of no small difficulty, and of singular interest to our community at the present moment. It gave the promise that you would discuss the character and tendency of opinions now prevalent in the midst of us, that you would meet some of the objections which have been advanced to popular theological ideas, that you would come directly to the great questions that are at issue between different portions of the audience which   you addressed. There was reason to hope that you would oppose certain substantial  obstacles to the current of thought which threatens in the view of some individuals to endanger our most valuable institutions, so that they who were inclined to this direction might find their difficulties removed, their ignorance enlightened, their love of vague and visionary speculations corrected, and the truth presented in so clear and attractive a light that they could not fail to receive it, while those who were attached to the contrary mode of thinking would be furnished with arguments sufficient to repel every alarming encroachment.

But instead of this mode of proceeding, you adopted one which could not have been expected from your statement of the subject, and which I conceive to have been singularly irrelevant to the demands of your audience and the nature of the occasion. Instead of meeting face to face the opinions which have found favor with many theologians in this country, which are publicly maintained from the pulpit and the press in our own immediate community, which form the cardinal points on which speculation is divided among us, you appear studiously to refrain from all mention of them; no one could infer from your remarks that any novel ideas had been broached in our theological world, excepting those whose origin can be traced back to the skeptical reasonings of Spinoza and Hume, and a comparatively small class of the modern theologians of Germany. You argue with considerable strength against their assumptions; but even if you had succeeded in their complete demolition, no progress would thus have been gained towards your main object, for, I venture to say, not ten copies of Spinoza's Works can be found in our vicinity—I greatly doubt whether there are ten persons among us who have ever read as many pages of his writings—and as for Hume's "famous Essay on Miracles," no one deems it worthwhile to disturb its repose in the dust of the library—at least it is so seldom that we hear its name alluded to that we may justly regard it as having gone to sleep. The case is the same with the German theologians, to whom you refer in the body of your Discourse. They have no weight with our theological inquirers, their day is fast declining in their own country, and no man acquainted with the progress of opinion in Germany could allude to the peculiar speculations of Paulus, for example, as exerting any perceptible influence on its present condition. The whole course of your reasoning in regard to the objections of Spinoza and Hume had no more connection with your subject than a refutation of the astrologers and alchemists of the Middle Ages. You undertook to speak of prevailing opinions; you were understood to have in view errors that have made their appearance among ourselves; but the doctrine which you oppose of the impossibility of miracles, on which you labor throughout a great part of your Discourse, and the annihilation of which you deem to be of such vital importance, is not known to have an advocate among our theologians. If there be one, I am sure, I never heard of him. The questions at issue in the new movement, as it is called, relate to a different subject. Your reasonings, accordingly, on the topic you chose, were thrown away. They excited no opposition, and therefore little interest. You failed to argue the points on which there is much solicitude and confined yourself to one which nobody conversant with the actual state of inquiry cares anything about.

But although you devoted yourself to the examination of past errors, of doctrines which, however formidable in another age, have no immediate effect on the present condition of thought, the circumstances in which you spoke, and the relations which you  sustain to   our theological community, could not fail to produce the impression that you had reference to existing opinions, that you were attacking ideas which were not only  cherished in past centuries and in foreign countries, but which were beginning to make progress, to exert a disastrous influence on the interests of sound thought and pure religion in our own land. It is this ambiguity that I complain of. A want of openness is never favorable to the cause of truth. The effect on those who now read your Discourse, as it was on most of your audience, unless they exercise a more than ordinary discrimination and independence of thought, unless they possess facilities for correct information, which of course were in your power, but which few are able to command, will be precisely the same as if you had charged the opinions you opposed on those who are understood to differ from you in your general views of theology. On former occasions, you had assumed the attitude of a chastiser of the heresies of your brethren; you had made yourself "the talk of the day" in our social circles by your zealous limitation of the rights of free inquiry, on account of the dangerous results to which it led. You were selected as the anniversary speaker in order that you might have a fair opportunity to do justice to your own views and practices in this respect, and sustain your position against your opponents; many came from far and near to be present on the occasion, at no small inconvenience to themselves, and not a man among them could doubt for a moment that you would express yourself with freedom, with clearness, with power, on the views of your brethren which were at war with your own.

Such being the case, it appears to me that peculiar caution and delicacy were requisite in order to avoid even the possibility of misapprehension. A sincere love of truth always leads us to be as circumspect in stating the opinions of an adversary as our own, and to exercise a scrupulous care that he be not placed in a false position, made responsible for errors which he disclaims, and confounded with men with whom he has no affinity. I should expect this rule to be violated by an excited controversialist in his passion for victory, but from a candid and ingenuous spirit, I should look for its most fastidious observance. The practical effect of this in other respects is somewhat singular, your readers at liberty to apply your remarks to the views of those whom you are accustomed to denounce; they would be perfectly justified in doing so, for aught that appears in your   Discourse, and to suppose that they do not would be affectation or folly. At the same time, a person not familiar with the present relations of our theological community, a stranger who did not perceive that more was signified than said, might feel surprised that anybody should take the trouble to reply to your assertions. You have given yourself the advantage, such as it is, of making an indirect attack through the medium of obsolete opinions, and if those to whom it is applied think it necessary to vindicate themselves, you can maintain that you had no such reference in view, and that the supposition, on their part, that you had is entirely gratuitous.

But the advantage you thus gain is momentary. It soon presents another aspect. I hardly need to state the dilemma to which you are reduced. If you meant to say that the opinions of Spinoza and Hume on the doctrine of miracles were adopted by that portion of your audience which differed from yourself, your Discourse was unjust; if you did not mean to say this, it was nugatory. And in either case, you were bound to express yourself so that one should not be left in the dark as to what you did mean. Or, if you took it for granted that those opinions were held by your opponents, you advanced an invidious charge, while you were ignorant of the facts. If you persist in saying that they are held, I call for the proof.

I do not intend, however, to dwell on these points. They relate to personal ethics, rather than to questions in theology. The cause of truth, in general, is not essentially affected by the mode which an individual adopts for the expression of his views, and I accordingly hasten to the discussion of the chief topic which I conceive worthy of attention in the statements of your Discourse. I refer to your adoption and defense of the exclusive principle in an Address before an assembly of liberal clergymen. By the exclusive principle, I mean the assumption of the right for an individual, or for any body of individuals, to make their own private opinions the measure of what is fundamental in the Christian faith. As liberal Christians, we have long contended against this principle, as contrary to the very essence of Protestantism; we have claimed the inherent right of private judgment as essential to Christian freedom; we have resisted, to the uttermost, every attempt to impose controverted points of opinion on the universal belief of the Church. We have welcomed every man as a brother who acknowledged Christ as his Master; we have not presumed to sit in judgment on any Christian's claim to discipleship; we have refused to entertain the question whether he were entitled to the Christian name; we have felt that it was not ours to give or to withhold, and that the decision in all cases, must rest with himself. It was not because our exclusive brethren made a belief in the Trinity a test of allegiance to Christ that we accused them of inconsistency with the liberty of the Gospel, but because they presumed to erect any standard whatever, according to which the faith of individuals should be made to conform to the judgment of others. It was not any special application of the principle that we objected to; it was the principle itself, and assuredly, the exercise of this principle does not change its character by reason of the source from which it proceeds. Nay, is it not aggravated by the fact that it is sustained, not by those with whom it forms a part of their religion, but by those whose religion is identified with hostility to it?

But the doctrine which lies at the foundation of your whole Discourse is a signal manifestation of the exclusive principle. You propose your own convictions—and convictions, which it will appear in the sequel of this letter, are directly at war with the prevailing faith of the Church—as the criterion of genuine Christian belief. You maintain that the truth of Christianity can be supported by no other evidence than that which appears satisfactory to yourself, that unless we are persuaded of the divine origin of our religion by the arguments which you deem valid, we cannot be persuaded at all, and that to speak of faith in the revelations of the Gospel, unless that faith be built on the only basis which you pronounce to be good, is, in itself, a proof of delusion or insincerity.    You make no allowance for the immeasurable variety of mind which is found everywhere, for the different direction which early education, natural temperament, and peculiar associations impart to men's habits of thinking, for the shifting lights which the same evidence presents, according to the circumstances in which it arrests the attention, or for the changes acquired by language, and the ideas which it conveys, in the progress of ages; but you advance your principle with the same want of reserve or qualification that a teacher of the Infallible Church would have exhibited before the Reformation; you declare that a certain kind of evidence, in your view, establishes the truth of Christianity, and that he who rests his faith on any other is an infidel, notwithstanding his earnest and open professions to the contrary. You thus, in fact, denied the name of Christian to not a few individuals in your audience, although you avoid discussing the grounds by which their opinions are supported. For it is perfectly well known that many of our most eminent clergymen—I will not refrain from speaking of them as they deserve, on account of my personal sympathy with their views—repose their belief in the divine origin of Christianity on a different foundation from that which you approve as the only tenable one. Men whose names are almost a passport to the opinions they adopt, whose lives are a guarantee against all suspicion of guile, whose fervent devotion to every cause that promises the extension of religion or the good of man has become proverbial, whose candor and transparency of character is a constant memorial of the simplicity of Christ, are inclined to rest their convictions of the divinity of the Gospel on evidence which commends itself to their minds, although you may pronounce it to be valueless and deceptive. Among those who adopt this view of Christianity are clergymen who have never enjoyed the benefit of your instructions, but whose minds have been kept open to every fresh access of light, as well as their younger brethren who are deeply indebted to your counsels and example in the pursuit of truth, and who have obtained from your influence in former years, something of that spirit of freedom for which they are now condemned.

But according to the doctrine of your Discourse, their faith in Christianity is either a self-deception or a pretence; the divine glory which they recognise in Christ is a vain chimera; they are disqualified for the office of Christian teachers; their very profession of Christianity is a blot on their characters; it calls in question either their intellect or their conscience, or both; they are exhorted to abandon a calling which they have no right to pursue, and since they do not receive your construction of the evidences of Christianity, to declare to the world that they repudiate the Savior and regard the glorious Gospel of the blessed God as the invention of man.

This application of the exclusive principle is the more remarkable when we consider the vehemence with which you have opposed it in reference to your own opinions. Within a few years, you have appeared as the public advocate of mental freedom, you have spurned, with sovereign displeasure, every restraint upon your independence, you have claimed and exercised the right of every man to form his own opinions on the doctrines of Christianity, without incurring the reproach of skepticism or insincerity, and no one has exhibited a more indignant eloquence than yourself at the introduction of personalities into religious discussions at the substitution of denunciation for argument, and at an appeal to the prejudices and timidity of men, rather than to their good sense and love of truth. So long as your own right to free investigation was called in question, you displayed a singular zeal in its defense, you rejected with just scorn the charge of infidelity, because you cherished conceptions of Christianity at war with the faith of the great majority of Christians, and you could hardly, if at all, admit the idea that any but a narrow and vulgar mind was capable of bringing such a charge. But you now present the same accusation against a portion of your fellow Christians for rejecting opinions which you adopt. Instead of answering their arguments, you attack their characters. You attempt to silence them not by persuasion, but by reproach. You refuse to meet them on equal grounds; you would first make them infidels in the eyes of the public, and then, if ever, examine their ideas.

The first avowed advocacy and exercise of the exclusive principle among liberal Christians, as far as I know, has been by yourself. Hitherto it has been confined to Christians of a different faith. They have had reasons for their proceeding which do not exist in your case. They condemned those who claimed the Christian name for the rejection of doctrines that had the sanction of the Church; you condemn them for not receiving opinions which are almost peculiar to yourself. They urged the necessity of doctrines which the testimony of religious consciousness had pronounced to be true; you denounce the opinion that divine truth can be perceived by the intuitions of consciousness. They insisted on the belief of doctrines which they held essential to the salvation of the soul; you insist on hypotheses which you confess have only a strong probability in their favor. They contended for doctrines which were supposed to form the very substance of Christianity; you contend for a method of establishing its evidence.[2]

I have thus far confined my remarks to your adoption of the exclusive principle, without a direct consideration of the doctrine in support of which you have given that principle the sanction of your authority. It would be a glaring inconsistency with all our modes of thought, with all our practical usages, as liberal Christians, for an individual to make any speculative opinion the standard of Christian faith, however true and important the opinion might be in itself. But the inconsistency is aggravated when the doctrine which is maintained on exclusive grounds can easily be shown to be almost peculiar to the individual by whom it is announced, at variance with the general belief of Christians in  every age, incapable of support from the teachings of Scripture and right reason, and involving consequences, of an irreligious and alarming character.

I sincerely regret that I am obliged by fidelity to my subject to show that this is the case with the leading doctrine of your Discourse. The leading doctrine, I say, for although you merely declare it, without advancing any considerations in its favor, without noticing the objections which press it on all sides, the manner in which you apply it to the defense of your views, evinces that it occupied the most prominent place in your mind, and that you intended it should form the strongest impression produced by your Discourse.

The doctrine to which I allude, and which I now mean to discuss, is that the miracles recorded in the New Testament are the ONLY PROOF of the divine origin of Christianity.

You assert (p. 5.) "that the divine authority of him whom God commissioned to speak to us in his name was attested, in the only mode in which it could be, by miraculous displays of his power." Christianity offers (p. 18.) "in attestation of the truths of the facts, which it reveals, the only satisfactory proof, the authority of God, evidenced by miraculous display of his power." (p. 22.) "No proof of the divine commission of Christ could be but through miraculous displays of God's power." But I need not multiply quotations to show your advocacy of a doctrine for which, I presume, you will not disclaim being responsible.

The question at issue, therefore, ought to be distinctly understood. It is not concerning the divine mission of Jesus Christ. The certainty of that will be at the foundation of my reasonings; and it is admitted, as far as I know, in all the controversies to which the subject has given rise in our own country.

Nor is it whether Jesus Christ performed the miracles ascribed to him in the New Testament. I shall hereafter allude to the doubts which are felt by many excellent Christians on this point, but for my own part, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the miracles related in the Gospels were actually wrought by Jesus. Without being blind to the difficulties of the subject, I receive this view, according to my best knowledge and understanding, on the evidence presented, and in this belief I am joined by a large number of those against whom your charge of infidelity is alleged among ourselves.

Neither does the question I am about to consider relate to any philosophical explanation of the miracles of Christ. I believe that he gave health to the sick, sight to the blind, and life to the dead, and my explanation of these facts that presented in the New Testament. "No man could do the miracles which he did, except God were with him" (John 3:2). "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power; who went about doing good; for God was with him" (Acts 10:38). If you have any different or any better explanation to offer of these facts, it would furnish an interesting object of examination, but can form no part of the present discussion.

Nor, finally, does the question relate to the validity of miracles as the credentials of a divine messenger. That question, it is true, forms an important topic of theological science. Much vague and superficial thought is exercised concerning it; it is often presented in a manner adapted to awaken the most lively doubts, and it demands a wise and thorough revision before, in the present state of opinion, it can receive an answer that will satisfy the earnest and reflecting Christian inquirer. But this is, by no means, the question at issue on the present occasion.

The point now to be considered is simply this: Are miracles the only evidence of the divine origin of Christianity?

Before proceeding to the arguments which prove that this position cannot be sustained, I must notice a palpable error into which you have been led by assuming the truth of the principle in question without examining its foundation. This error pervades the whole of your reasoning and must destroy its weight with every logical thinker. You confound two propositions which are essentially distinct; and you appear to have no suspicion that a distinction was necessary. This want of discrimination is the cause of a certain obscurity and vagueness in your statements, which make one doubtful at times whether he has rightly apprehended their meaning. But it is sufficiently clear that you make no distinction in your own mind, and express none in your Discourse, between a belief in a divine revelation, and in the miracles alleged in its support. You utterly confound the divine origin of Christianity and a certain class of the proofs of its divine origin.

Now the truth of the divine origin of Christianity is expressed by one proposition, the reality of the miracles of Jesus, by another; these propositions are clearly distinguished in all accurate thought, they are no less clearly distinguished in the history of opinions, and it by no means follows that, because a man receives or denies the one, he receives or denies the other also.

There are many Christians who have been convinced of the divine origin of Christianity not by miracles, but by other evidence. They acknowledge Jesus of Nazareth as the Savior of the world; they believe that the Divine Word which was in the beginning with God was made flesh in the Son of Mary, because they have seen his glory, full of grace and truth; they bow to his authority as to the authority of God; they rejoice in the revelations which he was inspired to make; but in the progress of inquiry they have become sensible to the difficulties which encumber the theory of miracles; they know the doubts which have been cast on their historical evidence; they are told by the most acute and learned critics—and you, Sir, are among the number[3]—that some of the miracles related in the Bible bear the marks of falsehood on their face, that the most probable account to be given of them is that they are legendary inventions; and can any one be surprised that, though believing in Christ and in his divine mission, they cannot say that they believe in the reality of the miracles? At least, they are in doubt, and they wish to suspend their judgment until further examination.

Such a state of mind, I well know, is not uncommon. There are few persons, who are called by their inclination or their profession to intimate religious communings with their fellowmen, that have not met with frequent instances of it. I cannot but express my surprise that you should not have known any individuals of this character in the course of your experience, or, if you have known such, that you should feel warranted to condemn them as you do. I own that I see no grounds on which their rigid and peremptory exclusion from the name of Christians can be justified. In certain cases, this state of mind becomes permanent; in others, it only forms one stage in the religious experience—the strong conviction of the divinity of Christ himself leads to an equally strong conviction of the divinity of his works.

I can hardly suppose that the description I have here presented will not be perfectly intelligible to yourself as well as to every reflecting reader, but that I may not be misunderstood by those who find it difficult to seize a point of view with which they are not familiar, it may be well to illustrate my statement by a reference to the form in which many, at the present day, believe in the legation of Moses. Indeed I am not sure that in regard to the religion of the Old Testament, you would not adopt these conceptions yourself. The believers I allude to are persuaded that God spoke by Moses—a special divine interposition seems necessary to them in order to account for the origin of Judaism—but yet they find reason to doubt the literal truth of the Mosaic miracles.    These miracles, in their view, extend too far into a dark and uncertain period of antiquity to impart a strong confidence as the foundation of faith; if their reception was essential to a belief in the inspiration of Moses, this fact would fail of reception also, but from other considerations, while they are not satisfied as to the reality of the Old Testament miracles, they are persuaded of the divine origin of the Old Testament religion.

In applying this case to the one already mentioned, the parallel should not be pushed too far. I do not mean to compare the inspiration and miracles of Moses with the inspiration and miracles of Christ, in respect to the divine power which they displayed or the evidence by which they are supported, but I maintain that precisely as certain individuals believe in the divine legation of Moses before they are satisfied in regard to his miracles, so certain individuals may believe in the divine mission of Christ before they are, satisfied concerning his miracles.

Let us bear this distinction in mind while we examine one or two passages in the Discourse, which relate to this point. It will thus be evident that you lost sight of a fundamental difference, and that, accordingly, as your subsequent reasonings are founded on error, they can have nothing but error as the consequence.

"By a belief in Christianity, we mean the belief that Christianity is a revelation by God of the truths of religion, and that the divine authority of him whom God commissioned to speak to us in his name was attested in the only mode in which it could be, by miraculous displays of his power." (p. 5.) A part of this passage has already been quoted in another connection; I refer to it now, for the purpose of pointing out the confusion of thought of which I have spoken.

"Christianity is a revelation by God of the truths of religion." This is a distinct, independent proposition. I may admit it without being obliged to admit any other which it does not logically include; but that this revelation "is attested by miraculous displays of God's power" is a quite different proposition. There is no necessary connection between them, and any argument, which you attempt to build on the supposition of such a connection, falls to the ground. The question in the first case is whether I believe that Christianity is a revelation by God of the truths of religion; how that revelation is attested is another question, and because I do not accept your answer to the last, you have no right to conclude that I give a negative answer to the first.

You are thus brought to the following alternative. If you say that the first part of your definition of a belief  in Christianity is incomplete and requires the second part for its complement, you maintain that one can believe "that Christianity is a revelation by God of the truths of religion," and yet be destitute of the essential Christian faith; or in other words, he can believe in the divine revelation of Christianity, and be an unbeliever at the same time. If you say that the first part of your definition is sufficient of itself, you abandon your ground and confess that you have brought the charge of infidelity without cause. If you say, finally, that the first part of your definition necessarily involves the  second, you beg the question in dispute, and I need not tell you what would be the value of reasoning that starts with a fallacy.

Again, you observe (p. 21) that "if it were not for the abuse of language that has prevailed, it would be idle to say that, in denying the miracles of Christianity, the truth of Christianity is denied." We here find the same unhappy confusion. You do not perceive that a belief in the Christian revelation is one thing, and a belief in the miracles which are claimed in its support is another. Whether the assertion you allude to were idle or not would depend on two circumstances. First, whether any believer professed to receive Christianity as a divine revelation, while he doubted the miracles (the miracles being not the revelation itself, but an element in its proof), and secondly, whether you called in question the reality of his belief in the revelation on account of his doubt of the miracles. If these circumstances existed, the assertion would not be idle. But it would contain a grave accusation, and one somewhat difficult of proof, one, indeed, to which it is not easy to attach any definite meaning, namely, that a man who believed the divine origin of Christianity denied the truth of Christianity.

You continue the same train of thought as follows. "It is in vain to attempt to strike out what relates directly or indirectly to the miraculous authority and works of Christ, with the expectation that anything consistent or coherent will remain. It is as if one were to undertake to cut out from a precious agate, the figure which nature has inwrought, and to pretend that, by the removal of this accidental blemish, the stone might be left in its original form." (p. 23) This is a beautiful illustration, but an illustration is not an argument, and it sometimes dazzles the eye, so that it cannot perceive the truth. It is so in this case. You confound the "divine authority" of Christ with his "miraculous works."    You thus lose the force of your comparison. It would have been more pertinent if you had said that, as he who removes the frame in which a precious stone is set does not destroy the gem, so he who doubts the miraculous accounts which form the outside of Christianity does not necessarily deny the divine origin of the religion itself.

The distinction which is now insisted on cannot be set aside by the assertion that the divine mission of Christ is itself a miracle. For in that case, you change the question at issue, which relates not to the divine mission of Christ, but to the evidence by which it is  supported. If you say that a belief in the divine mission of Christ is all the belief in miracles you contend for, you acknowledge that you have brought a groundless charge against your opponents, for the divine mission of Christ they have never denied. But if you say that the divine mission of Christ cannot be separated from the miracles usually alleged as proof, you confound two points, which, as we have seen, are essentially distinct. This confusion can be justified only by the principle that "miracles are the sole proof of a divine revelation," but in assuming this principle, you assume what is not yet settled, and what I shall show, if I do not deceive myself, has no evidence in its favor.

It has been my purpose, in the preceding remarks, to point out the looseness of reasoning with which you attempt to support the exclusive doctrine of your Discourse. I have shown, as I trust, that a denial of the divine origin of Christianity, and a denial of the miracles related in the New Testament, are two different things, that there is no real or necessary connection between them, but it will be perceived by every accurate thinker that this statement does not affect the question concerning the reality of the miracles. It does not deny them; it does not bring them under suspicion; it leaves them just where they were before: great problems in the experience of man to be resolved by the united aids of history and philosophy. I have already stated that the evidence by which they are supported, on the whole, appears satisfactory to my mind, though I have no disposition to force my conviction on the minds of others.

I proceed now to an examination of the doctrine of your Discourse, that the evidence of miracles is the only proof of a divine revelation.

I. The intelligent reader will at once be struck with the boldness, the extravagance, and the novelty of this doctrine. If he has paid the slightest attention to theological inquiries, and is acquainted with the manner in which the evidences of Christianity have usually been presented, he will wonder at the radical innovation which you attempt to introduce into a familiar and important topic of theological science. Heretofore, it has been counted a signal excellence of Christianity that it was capable of proof by a great variety of evidence. In this respect, its adaptation to be a universal religion has been earnestly set forth, its ablest defenders have supported it on the ground that it appealed to a multiplicity of proofs, and its claims to the character of a revelation from God have been maintained by manifold considerations, according to the tendency of the minds to which it was addressed.

Thus, while the argument from miracles has formed a prominent topic of discussion, other arguments have been derived from prophecy and its fulfillment, from the character of Christ, from the excellence of his doctrine, from the wisdom and comprehensiveness of his plan, from the rapid propagation of Christianity in the most unpropitious circumstances, from the tendency of the Gospel to satisfy the wants of the soul, from the actual effects it has produced on the civilization and happiness of the world, and from its harmony with the suggestions of the higher nature of man.

Each of these arguments—and I have not attempted to enumerate all that have been alleged—has been regarded as powerful in itself, some of them alone sufficient to produce a rational faith, certainly a conviction that Christianity is more probably true than false, which, according to your Discourse, is all that can be sustained on the highest grounds of evidence; and, taken together, they have been supposed to form a moral demonstration, impregnable against the assaults of infidelity. The process of reasoning has been to advance directly from these proofs to the divine origin of Christianity, to make the same inference from them as to the mission of Christ, which you derive from the miracles.

We find, accordingly, that different writers have discussed different branches of the Christian evidences; one is distinguished for his masterly exposition of the argument from prophecy, another for his admirable illustration of the internal characteristics of Christianity, another for his accurate historical investigation of its effects on the social condition of man, a fourth establishes the coincidence between the truths of revelation and the testimony of reason, while another argues from the miracles of Christ to the divinity of his mission, though he does not maintain with yourself that they are the only satisfactory proof. In like manner, it is found that the effects of these arguments vary with the natural disposition and mental habits of the individuals to whom they are presented. Some are powerfully affected by one portion of the Christian evidence, others by that of a different character; miracles are conclusive to one, prophecy to another, and the intrinsic nature of Christianity to a third; what appears little short of mathematical demonstration to me, is lightly esteemed by my neighbor, while that which produces conviction in his mind, fails of any perceptible influence on mine.

Now if I rightly apprehend your doctrine, you maintain that as miracles are the only adequate proofs of a divine revelation, all the other branches of evidence which have usually been relied on are destitute of independent force; they are good to confirm the probability of miracles, but for nothing else. You observe (p. 21) that "it has been vaguely alleged that the internal evidences of our religion are sufficient, but this can be said by no one who understands what Christianity is, and what its internal evidences are." "The internal evidence of Christianity," according to your Discourse (p. 25) consists in this circumstance, namely, that the history of Jesus being full of accounts of his miracles, everything in his history, what relates to himself and what relates to others, is conformed to this fact and to the conception of him as speaking with authority from God." The internal evidence, therefore, is no proof in itself of the divine authority of Christ; it is reduced to a mere negative element, nothing but a condition for the validity of the external evidence; the Gospel is deprived of all inherent marks of truth and divinity.    You thus deny the strength of the arguments by which the faith of a multitude of Christians is sustained, but in so doing, you advance a principle, which I will not call "the latest form of infidelity," but which is certainly at war with the prevailing faith of Christians in every age of the Church.

I do not indeed assert that this doctrine of the exclusive validity of miraculous evidence is original with yourself. It may have been advanced by theological innovators in former ages, but it has never gained credit with any considerable portion of the church, and, until it was broached by an eminent Scottish divine of our own daya writer, in allusion to whose work on the "Evidences of Christianity" you have pronounced to be "thoroughly ignorant of the subject"[4]—it could hardly be said to have received a public advocacy as a principle of theology. The honor of bringing it forward is shared between yourself and Dr. Thomas Chalmers. Differing as you do from him on other points, on this you take possession of his ground. The identity of doctrine produces even a similarity of expression. Dr. Chalmers declares that, independent of revelation "of the invisible God, we have no experience whatever."[5] You remark that the mere fact of revelation "introduces God within the sphere of human experience."[6] Dr. Chalmers observes that, "in the miracles of Christ, the existence of God is laid before us by an evidence altogether distinct from the natural argument of the schools."[7] You maintain that "the miraculous communication from God to men makes his existence a reality to our minds."[8] Dr. Chalmers insists that the only internal evidence which is entitled to credit, is that taken from "the marks of truth and honesty in the performance itself," "the consistency of the particulars with what we already know from other sources of information."[9] You contend that the only internal evidence which is entitled to credit, is that taken from "the consistency in the representations given by the different evangelists of the actions and words of Christ, as a messenger from God to men,"[10] and from other similar considerations. Dr. Chalmers "disclaims all support from what is commonly understood by the internal evidence, consisting of those proofs that Christianity is a dispensation from heaven, which are founded upon the nature of its doctrines and the character of the dispensation itself."[11] You assert that no one who "understood" the subject would rely upon this evidence.[12] Dr. Chalmers, however, tells us that, in this course of reasoning, he deviates from "the general example of those who have written on the Deistical   controversy,"[13] and he assigns some plausible arguments in favor of this deviation. You do not intimate that your procedure is novel, nor do you present any reasons in its defense.    I ought to add, in justice to Dr. Chalmers, that at a subsequent period, he retracted his position. The fallacy and dangerous effects of his doctrine were ably pointed out,[14] and in the preface to a new edition of his Work, he modifies his statements as follows, thus virtually abandoning the whole ground: "The Author is far from asserting the study of the historical evidence to be the only channel to a faith in the truth of Christianity. How could he, in the face of the obvious fact that there are thousands and thousands of Christians who bear the most undeniable marks of the truth having come home to their understanding 'in demonstration of the Spirit and of power'? They have an evidence within themselves, which the world knoweth not, even the promised manifestations of the Savior. This evidence is a 'sign to them that believe.'"[15]

I will now adduce a part of the historical testimony, which shows that the doctrine of the exclusive validity of miraculous evidence receives no support from the general faith of the Church.

The early Christian apologists, in their defense of the Gospel, did not confine themselves to any single branch of the evidences. So far from regarding miracles as the only proof, they laid comparatively small stress on their importance. The argument from miracles was slighted, while great use was made of that from prophecy.[16] Whoever regarded Jesus as the Son of God was acknowledged as a disciple, without reference to the foundation on which his faith was built. I will not weary you with a detail of evidence in illustration of this fact. The following passage from one of our most learned scholars, whose acquaintance with Christian antiquity entitles his statements to great weight, contains the substance of the matter in a small compass. Speaking of Justin Martyr, he observes, "Of the evidence from miracles he scarcely takes any notice. Perhaps the cause may be traced to the popular belief of the age. The efficacy of incantations and magic forms part of this belief, common alike to Christians and Pagans. Miracles were regarded as of no rare occurrence, and they were supposed to be wrought by magical arts. Christianity might then have the support of miracles, but this support would be regarded as of trifling importance by those who were believers in the reality of charms and sorcery. The   miracle might be admitted, but the evidence derived from it could be invalidated by ascribing it to the effects of magic. That the early Fathers and Apologists really felt a difficulty of this kind, there can be no doubt. The Jews had set the example by attributing the miracles of our Savior to a demoniacal agency. That the heathen trod in their steps by ascribing them to magical influences, we gather from a hint Justin himself has incidentally dropped, and Origen expressly affirms it as regards Celsus. Here then was a grand objection to the evidence from miracles, and one which the Fathers, who were themselves firm believers in the powers of magic and demoniacal influences, must have found it exceedingly difficult to remove."[17] It does not meet the point to say that this objection was founded on a popular superstition of the primitive ages; it is sufficient that the objection was felt, for therefore some other evidence was deemed important, and therefore, in fine, the early apologists did not hold to the modern doctrine that miracles are the only proof of a divine revelation.

The same view concerning the value of miracles was held by the original founders of the Protestant Church. They express themselves in language which reminds us of the most spiritual writers of a later age in defense of the testimony addressed to the soul compared with that addressed to the senses. The miracles of Christianity, in their opinion, were by no means the only foundation of belief in Christ. On the contrary, there were other evidences of a more impressive and convincing character. They relied much on the proof taken from Christian experience. The religion, it was argued, which had regenerated the soul, must be from God. I will quote but one or two passages from the great Reformer himself, which are in direct opposition to the doctrine of your Discourse.

"People cry it up as a great miracle that Christ made the blind see, the deaf hear, and the lepers clean; and, it is true, such works are miraculous signs, but Christ regards his influence on the soul as far more important than that on the body, for as the soul excels the body, so do the miracles wrought on the former excel those wrought on the latter.    He distinguishes, therefore, two kinds of miraculous works, and it still continues to be the fact, and it will continue till the last day, that Christ daily and always performs miraculous works. The former, we admit, he rarely performs; so he did when on earth, for he did not give sight to many blind, he did not heal all the sick, he left many blind and not healed. And what if he had given sight or hearing to a whole heap of people, nay, had raised them from the dead? For such signs were merely for the purpose of founding the Christian Church. Hence such outward signs and miracles are neither eternal nor common. But the moral signs which Christ regards as miracles, never cease."[18]

"The miracles, which Christ wrought on the body, are small and almost childish, compared with the high and true miracles which he constantly performs in the Christian world by his divine, almighty power. For instance, that Christianity is preserved on the earth, that the word of God and faith in him can yet hold out, yea, that a Christian can survive on earth against the devil and all his angels, also against so many tyrants and factions, yea, against our own flesh and blood. The fact that the Gospel remains and improves the human heart—this is indeed to cast out the devil, and tread on serpents, and speak with tongues, for those visible miracles were merely signs for the ignorant, unbelieving crowd, and for those who were yet to be brought in; but for us, who know and believe, what need is there of them? For the heathen, indeed, Christ must needs give external signs, which they could see and take hold of, but Christians must needs have far higher signs, compared with which the former are earthly. It was necessary to bring over the ignorant with external miracles and to throw out such apples and pears to them as to children, but we, on the contrary, should boast of the great miracles which Christ daily performs in his church."[19]

I come now to a more recent period. Time would fail me if I were to attempt to quote a thousandth part of what has been written in opposition to your principle. I might indeed transcribe nearly the whole of modern English Theology, with the exception of a few writers, who were led by the philosophy of Locke to attach an extravagant value to external evidence. It everywhere recognises the fact that miracles are not the only proof of Christianity, and strongly insists on other arguments which furnish a valid defense of its divine origin. I will begin with Dr. Barrow, a man whose familiarity with mathematical demonstration did not blunt his mind to the finer distinctions of moral evidence, and who certainly is not usually addicted to what is either novel, or visionary, or heretical.

In the introduction to his admirable Discourse on "The Excellency of the Christian Religion," he remarks, "It is my intent to endeavor now some declaration and proof, by representing briefly some peculiar excellencies and perfections of our religion, which may serve to evince the truth and evidence the wisdom thereof, to make good that our religion well deserveth the privilege it doth claim of a divine extraction, that it is not an invention of man, but as Paul calleth it, the wisdom of God, proceeding from no other but the God of truth and wisdom. It is indeed a common subject, and so the best ever should be; it is always profitable and now seasonable to inculcate it for the confirmation of ourselves and the conviction of others in this age of wavering and warping towards infidelity."[20]

But according to your doctrine, nothing could be more injudicious than this course, for it would divert the attention from the only satisfactory evidence of the truth of Christianity; and instead of putting a stop to infidelity, would favor its progress.

A similar testimony is given by one of the ablest defenders of Christianity that the English Church can boast of, Dr. Samuel Clarke: "The practical duties which the Christian religion enjoins are all such as are most agreeable to our natural notions of God and most perfective of the nature and conducive to the happiness and well-being of men; that is, Christianity, even in this single respect, as containing alone and in one consistent system all the wise and good precepts that ever were  taught singly and scatteredly, and  many times but very corruptly by the several schools of the philosophers, ought to be embraced and practised by all rational and considering Deists as highly probable, even though it had no external evidence to be of divine original."[21] "Let any impartial person judge whether a religion that tends manifestly to the recovery of the rational part of God's creation, to restore men to the imitation and likeness of God, and to the dignity and highest improvement of their nature, has not within itself an intrinsic and very powerful evidence of its being truly divine. Let any man of an honest and sincere mind consider whether its practical doctrine has not even in itself the greatest marks of a divine original. On this consideration alone, all sincere inquirers must needs be strongly inclined to embrace the Christian religion, to believe that it is truly divine, and to entertain it with all cheerfulness, as what in itself has those manifold marks of goodness and perfection, which are themselves sufficient to satisfy a good man, that it cannot be anything else than a revelation from God, even though it had wanted all outward proofs and divine and miraculous testimonies."[22]

There is no end to citations like these, and I will content myself with referring to one more foreign writer, who is no less attractive on account of the clearness and simplicity of his style than the sobriety and justness of his reasonings. I mean Dr. Alexander Gerard, Professor of Divinity at Aberdeen. "The external evidences of Christianity," says Dr. Gerard, "are miracles and prophecy; these are the directest proofs of its divinity. Its internal evidence, however, has likewise considerable force, much greater force, it might easily be shown, than some Christian writers have allowed it. This evidence arises from its excellence…. Our Savior and his Apostles were led by the objections of unbelievers to assert, not only that the Gospel is excellent, but also that its excellence is a real evidence of its divinity. Our Savior exhibited this evidence in its full strength. He delivered doctrines which were really excellent and bore clear marks of truth and divinity. He left his hearers to feel the excellence of his religion and, from their feeling of its energy, to conclude for themselves that it was of heavenly original. It was not by means of his encomiums, but by means of their own perceptions, that great numbers discovered the features of divinity in his discourses."[23]

Nor are the opinions of orthodox theologians in our own country less at variance with your doctrine that miracles are the only evidence of a divine revelation.

"The holiness of the life of Christ," says President Dwight, "is another proof of the divine origin of the Gospel, a proof not less solid than the miracles, although perhaps less frequently allowed its full force."[24]

An eminent citizen and scholar, of whom this country is justly proud, has devoted a large space, in a work on the proofs of revealed religion, to a consideration of the "arguments for the divine origin of Christianity, which may be drawn from that internal evidence of truth which its doctrines contain."[25] "These internal evidences of Christianity," says Mr. Verplanck," are those on which it is most generally, and far most sincerely and fervently, believed, so that the unlettered Christian, who is utterly ignorant of that body of history and learning which attests the veracity of the Gospel narrative, and who, so far from being able to refute the objections of an ingenious opponent, would find it exceedingly difficult to explain the reasons of his belief to another, may yet possess a ground of confidence in its truth, not resting upon logical argument, yet of a strictly rational character, which, in his mind, could derive but little additional strength from the learned labors of Lardner, the ingenuity of Warburton, or the sagacity of Paley."[26]

"The most convincing evidence of the truth of Christianity," says one of our most esteemed religious writers, Mr. Jacob Abbott, "is that which results from witnessing its moral power over the human heart. I have often heard it remarked, by men amply qualified to investigate such subjects, that the power of the Bible, as they have often seen it exerted, has made a far stronger impression upon them, in favor of its divine origin, than any examination of the labored arguments of learned men."[27]

The exclusive doctrine of your Discourse presents a striking contrast to the views of the leading writers, whom, as liberal Christians, we are accustomed to venerate. No class of men have dwelt more earnestly or more successfully on the proof of the divine origin of Christianity from considerations independent of miracles than the honored theologians whose names are identified with mental freedom and religious progress in this country.

I commence with Buckminster, whose generous spirit passed away from us too early, in whose presence intolerance stood rebuked, "whose intrepid mind nothing could depress, whose vigorous understanding broke so easily the little meshes which were spread to entangle it." The character of Christ was the ground on which he loved to rest his faith in the Gospel; like the Apostle, he saw the divine glory in the face of Jesus. He did not believe, according to the representation of your Discourse, that we can have no "perception," or "intuition" of the truth of Christianity, that outward prodigies are essential to a living faith within the soul; though fond of historical research and attached to the evidence of miracles, so far from deeming them the only proof of the divinity of the Gospel, he declares that there is much evidence beside them and superior to them, that a constant study of Christianity furnishes a constant increase of its proofs, and that having satisfied himself, as far as possible, concerning the historical testimony to its truth, the learner should direct his attention to the internal evidence, the character of  Christ, the nature of his instructions, and the spirit of the Gospel. "In this way," says Buckminster, "if he is an inquirer of an ingenuous disposition, and of a heart warmed with the love of virtue, he will love the Gospel too well to permit any relics of doubt to disturb him; he will be unable to reject what appears so divine, and what he finds so powerful, or to think it to be anything else than what he wishes it to be—the word of God."[28]

This appears to me to be the soundest theology, clothed in beautiful and impressive language, and it involves more than is obvious on a hasty perusal. It comprises almost everything on the present subject which I should be disposed to contend for. According to this statement, the relics of doubt, which are left after the historical testimony has produced all the conviction of which it is capable, are removed by an intuitive perception of the divinity of the Gospel. External evidence alone can never completely satisfy the mind, but the inherent character of Christianity shows the ingenuous inquirer that it is the word of God.

Mr. Buckminster proceeds to illustrate the superiority of the evidence of a divine interposition taken from the character of Christ over that derived from the record of miracles: "There is something in the character of Christ, which, to an attentive reader of his history, is of more force than all the weight of external evidence to prove him divine."[29] After a masterly portraiture of the character of the Redeemer, showing the fullness of Divinity with which it was pervaded, proving that Christ himself was the great moral miracle far transcending the outward works which he performed, the Discourse concludes with an express recognition of the power in human nature to discover the manifestations of God in the presence of moral sublimity and loveliness: "Have you caught, my hearers," exclaims this eloquent advocate of Christian truth, "have you caught any glimpses of Jesus? If you believe in him as he was, if you love what you know of him, and imitate what you love, and study to know more and more of his character, you will see that he was in the Father and the Father in him, for the more like God, the perfection of all excellence, you become, the more will you feel all that is godlike in his Son."[30]

I should look in vain for more appropriate or forcible language than this to express the doctrine which I deem of such vital importance to the true apprehension of Christianity.

Of a similar faith, as well as of a kindred spirit, with Mr. Buckminster was his friend and biographer, whose name holds a conspicuous rank in the annals of the New England clergy. And there have been few, indeed, among the scholars whose memory is cherished by their native land who united such clearness of intellect, such unerring good sense, such instinctive delicacy of taste, such aversion to whatever is extravagant in opinion or conduct, with such genuine modesty and sweetness of character, as the late Mr. Thacher. Though personally unknown to me, I cannot remember the time when I did not regard him as a being of superior dignity and holiness; the reputation of his mild virtues are associated with my first perception of the moral power of Christianity. The tidings of his decease in a foreign clime threw a gloom over my boyish pleasures; the memory of that hour comes over the long interval of years in connection with other venerated forms now no more, and shall I ask to be forgiven for this spontaneous tribute to one whose opinions were at the foundation of his character, whose character is the best commentary on his opinions? I might refer to his whole Sermon on the "Originality of the Christian System" as an illustration of the grounds on which he was accustomed to teach the divine origin of the Gospel, but I will only quote one or two brief passages, which suffice for the purpose that I have in view: "The originality of the doctrines of Christ was such that he could not have learned them from any human source. This illustrates the divinity of its claims."[31] The preacher then unfolds his subject by showing that the idea of a universal religion, the perfect system of human duty, and the originality of the Savior's character, present such  conclusive proofs of the divinity of his mission, independent of other evidence, that it is next to impossible not to believe "that the God of benevolence, in mercy to his children, sent his Son on the earth to realize such a character and to teach us, by his perfect example, how we should live, how we should suffer, and a still harder lesson, how we should die."[32]

The same doctrine is maintained by the late Dr. Parker, whose singular devotion to the practical duties of the ministry did not destroy his interest in theological inquiry, nor lead him to neglect the nicer discriminations of truth and the evidence on which it rests. "When we look at the teachings of Jesus," he says, "it would seem as if he had conversed with the spirits of light and were bringing down to earth their radiant conceptions of truth, as if he had indeed been in the bosom of the Father and were commissioned to bring to men his counsels, as if he needed no other testimony than the very lessons which he taught, to the truth of his own declaration, 'My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me.'"[33] "Even miracles, though they might convince the mind, yet could hardly have reached the character with a transforming power, independently of the nature of the   instructions dispensed. These were such as find an advocate in every unperverted mind, and every uncorrupted heart. They come with divine power to the conscience. They are adapted to the actual wants of man's spiritual nature. Herein lies their divine efficacy. They suit the necessities alike of the child and of the philosopher."[34] "They have been found adapted to the condition and wants of the most cultivated minds; and let the human race go on for a hundred centuries in improvement, yet Christianity will be still in advance of them, still the pioneer of their onward progress. This is a wonderful fact, considering the circumstances under which our religion was promulgated, and attests with power the divine authority of its founder, and his adaptation to his great and godlike work."[35]

Such were the views of a man who certainly could not be accused of indifference to the moral wants of the community, whose practical good sense enabled him to judge what kind of evidence was best suited to make a deep impression on the majority of minds and prevented him from being imposed on by the semblance of truth instead of its reality. He saw that there was other testimony to the Gospel beside the works of Jesus; he was alive to the proofs of its divinity from its effects on the human soul, for his experience was large, and he was compelled to trace the influence he had witnessed to a heavenly source.

I come now to the evidence that the doctrine of your Discourse is contradictory to the opinions of those living writers who have contributed in no small degree to the establishment and support of a liberal theology in our churches. But while I bring forward their testimony in opposition to your exclusive doctrine, let me not be understood to pretend to their countenance in any real or supposed errors of my own. I would not claim the support even of those I so much esteem for any opinions which are looked on with suspicion. They may agree with me in the rejection of your theory of the Christian evidence, while they agree in nothing else. I refer to the public expression of their views, merely to show that they do not regard the evidence of miracles as the only proof of the divine origin of Christianity.

"The internal evidences of Christianity," says a writer in the Christian Examiner, "is a subject which is every day growing in importance and interest. Without going into the inquiry how far the alleged miracles of Christianity are fitted to keep alive a veneration for it in future ages, we feel no hesitation in saying that the time has come when the attention is to be more and more directed to the indication of its origin borne on its features—to the cast of its doctrines and morality—to its tendency, spirit, and object. These are evidences, of the force of which all feel capable of judging. They are more within our reach, fall more immediately under our observation, than some other species of evidence. They are not of a perishable character, not temporary and fading. They multiply and strengthen with age. They have a sort of universal presence. They are felt wherever Christianity is received. The evidence from miracles, however satisfactory, is by its nature more local and confined. It overpowers the understandings of spectators, but time takes something from its freshness and strength. For ourselves, we are disposed to rely much on the marks of a heavenly origin that Christianity bears on the face of it. We think that we may appeal with confidence to its internal evidences. They form one of our strongholds, which we do not fear ever being compelled to surrender. Should it be abandoned, Christianity would be in great danger of falling."[36]

"Christianity," says another writer in the same Journal, "embodies a collection of moral and vital truths, and these truths, apart from all history or philosophy, constitute Christianity itself. Instead, therefore, of perplexing and confounding the young with what are called the evidences of Christianity, give them Christianity itself. Begin by giving them Christianity itself, as exhibited in the life and character of the Lord Jesus, as illustrated by his simple, beautiful, and touching parables, and as it breathes through all his discourses. They will feel it to be true. Depend upon it, paradoxical as it may sound, children will be much more likely to believe Christianity without what are called the evidences than with them, and the remark applies to some who are not children. Why talk to one about the argument from prophecy, or the argument from miracles, when these are the very points and the only points on which his mind, from some peculiarity in its original constitution, or from limited information, chiefly labors. Give him Christianity itself, by which we mean the body of moral and vital truths which constitutes Christianity. Observe it when you will, you will find that the doubts and difficulties, suggested by children, relate almost exclusively to the history of Christianity, or to what are called the external evidences of Christianity, and not to the truth of Christianity itself. Give them Christianity itself, for if they believe in that, it is enough. Nothing can be more injudicious than to persist in urging the argument from miracles on a mind that, from any cause, has thus become indifferent and perhaps impatient of it. How idle to think to convince a person of Christianity by miracles, when it is these very miracles, and not Christianity, that he doubts. The instances, we suspect, are not rare, even of adults, who are first converted to Christianity itself, and afterwards, through the moral and spiritual change which Christianity induces, are brought to believe entirely and devoutly in its miraculous origin and history."[37]

"There is another evidence of Christianity," says Dr. Channing, "still more internal than any on which I have yet dwelt, an evidence to be felt rather than described, but not less real, because founded on feeling. I refer to that conviction of the divine original of our religion, which springs up and continually gains strength in those who apply it habitually to their tempers and lives, and who imbibe its spirit and hopes. In such men there is a consciousness of the adaptation of Christianity to their noblest faculties; a consciousness of its exalting and consoling influences, of its power to confer the true happiness of human nature, to give that peace which the world cannot give, which assures them that it is not of earthly origin, but a ray from the Everlasting Light, a stream from the fountain of Heavenly Wisdom and Love. This is the evidence which sustains the faith of thousands who never read and cannot understand the learned books of Christian apologists, who want perhaps words to explain the ground of their belief, but whose faith is of adamantine firmness, who hold the Gospel with a conviction more intimate and unwavering than mere arguments ever produced."[38]

The last testimony I shall present against the doctrine that miracles are the only evidence of a divine revelation, that the external evidence is everything and the internal evidence nothing, is from the Reviewer of Verplanck's Internal Evidences in the Christian Examiner.

"It seems to be part of the economy of Providence, in relation to Christianity, that there should be some kind of evidence or other adapted to the character of every mind. While one rests satisfied with the historical and internal critical evidence, and thinks himself an incompetent judge of the moral internal evidence, another recurs to the latter as the 'grander, broader, and more powerful.' We rejoice in the power and the concurrence of both to establish the same truth. The adaptation of Christianity to the nature of man, and its conformity with what we know of the character of God, is unquestionably, to him who will reflect upon it, a very powerful evidence of its divine origin."[39]

This article I have always heard ascribed to your own pen, and if this be correct, it only shows that in some instances, a change of opinion may not be a "crime," and that even wise and good "men throw out their opinions rashly, reserving to themselves the liberty of correcting them if they are wrong. If you would know for what doctrines they hold themselves responsible, you must look to their last publication."[40]

The doctrine of your Discourse is still more forcibly contradicted in the following passage from a work which bears your name: "The wisdom and the self-restraint, for so it is to be considered, of our Savior, in confining his teaching to the essential truths of religio